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Rh limits of theology, philosophy, and science: "Theology, philosophy, and science," he writes, "constitute our spiritual triumvirate. . . . Its [theology's] main province is the province of feeling; its office is the systematization of our religious conceptions. The office of science is distinct. It may be defined as the systematization of the order of phenomena considered as phenomena. The office of philosophy is again distinct from these. It is the systematization of the conceptions furnished by theology and science—ὲπιστήμη ὲπιστημᾥν (the science of sciences). This "History of Philosophy" was commenced by its author with the definite purpose of showing the radical weakness of all metaphysics. "The history of philosophy," he writes, "presents the spectacle of thousands of intellects—some of the greatest that have made our race illustrious—steadily concentrated on problems believed to be of vital importance, yet producing no other result than a conviction of the extreme facility of error. The only conquest has been critical, i. e., physiological." His opinion of the value of scientific methods in philosophical inquiry is expressed in the following passage: "There are many who deplore the encroachment of science, fondly imagining that metaphysical philosophy would respond better to the higher wants of man. This regret is partly unreasoning sentiment, partly ignorance of the limitations of human faculty. Even among those who admit that ontology is an impossible attempt, there are many who think it should be persevered in, because of the 'lofty views' it is supposed to open to us. This is as if a man, desirous of going to America, should insist on walking there, because journeys on foot are more poetical than journeys by steam. He dies without reaching America, but to the last gasp he maintains that he has discovered the route on which others may reach it." In 1853 Mr. Lewes contributed to Bohn's "Scientific Library" a volume entitled "Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences."

Five years later (1858) appeared his "Seaside Studies at Ilfracombe." For the meeting of the British Association, the same year, he prepared a paper on "The Spinal Cord as a Centre of Sensation and Volition;" in 1859 he published three papers on "The Nervous System," in which he combated the received doctrines. These papers gave rise to a warm discussion among British physiologists, and even attracted much attention on the Continent of Europe. The "Physiology of Common Life" appeared in 1860, and in the following year was published "Studies in Animal Life." The object of these researches into the nervous system of animals and man was, as he informs us in the preface of his latest work, to obtain the clew through the labyrinth of mental phenomena. Misled by the plausible supposition that the complex phenomena in man might be better interpreted by approaching them through the simpler phenomena in animals, he began to collect materials for a work on animal psychology. But he was not then aware that, rightly to understand the mental condition of animals,