Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 9.djvu/249

Rh parts, and to establish their exact relations. He compares, adds, subtracts, multiplies, divides. In order to communicate his knowledge of the relation of parts, he must use words; these words he must define, if their meaning is not obvious to the one instructed. But if the property is of a primary nature, and given in the experience of every one, there is no need of definition, and indeed no rational definition can be given. This is true alike of the notions, extension, surface, line, and point. Each of these is as much a datum of simple experience as the notion of white or blue; and it is just as absurd to attempt to define the one class of concepts as the other. They may be, however, brought out a little more closely by contrasting the correlatives in the manner that we have attempted with extension and indefinite space. Thus surface may be contrasted with the solid volume, or definite space, of which it forms the boundary; line with surface, of which it in turn is the boundary; and, lastly, point with line, of which it is the termination or the where of separation. It is not true that the existence of forms depends upon the motions of points. Forms are given in experience through sensation. A point is the ultimate step in the analysis of boundaries. It is sheer nonsense to attempt to construct lines out of points, surfaces out of lines, and volumes out of surfaces. All that it is necessary to say further upon this subject is, that the differentiæ of the higher mathematics are not nothings, but quantities the least conceivable. The least conceivable portion of a line is not a point; the least conceivable portion of a surface is not a line; the least conceivable portion of a volume is not a surface, for the simple reason that no portion of a thing can be its boundary.

Now, in conclusion, we say that geometry rests upon no affirmations in respect to the infinite, but, on the contrary, it is wholly occupied about the relations of the finite in space. We have the assurance from the doctor that the finite is the sphere of every science, while the sphere of religion is the infinite. This certainly would cast theology out of the sphere of science, for the doctor has laid down as one of its fundamental concepts, "God is an infinite person." Sir William Hamilton's definition, in its very first clause, also excludes theology from science, if we take himself as authority for the meaning of the term cognition. Every cognition is simply a perception of relation. The infinite and absolute—equal God—are not thinkable. Hence theology can have no "complement of cognition" out of which to classify a science.

In another place we find that the cry of conflict has its origin in confounding theology with religion. "Theology is not religion any more than psychology is human life, or zoölogy animal life, or botany plant-life. Theology is objective, religion is subjective. Theology is the scientific classification of what is known of God; religion is a loving obedience to God's commandments. Every religious man