Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 85.djvu/269

Rh native talent, trained minds. Who shall believe that the sea of affairs can be charted, and can be sailed by the aid of eternal principles and a fine exact technique of diplomatic and humane methods, and who shall be at least as much devoted to the ennoblement of their art as to their own advancement.

The new order always evolves out of the old with pain and misunderstanding. The new is long looked upon from the inadequate viewpoint of the old. The exigencies of the new situation are always upon us before the teachings of the old have been sufficiently deliberated upon to yield a settled philosophy of action. It is not surprising that this generation should be embarrassed in finding new maxims and ideals, while it is yet blinded by the brilliant achievements of the age of the captains of industry. The shadows of the great founders still fall upon the present-day executive in many forms. In one case it is the tradition of methods once successful, and of conceptions and tests once considered adequate. In another case it is embodied as the incompetent heir, invested with an estate and the glamor of a successful name, and set as an amateur to rule over experts. Again, the shadow of a departing order takes the form of a vast enterprise, which was, perhaps, originally builded with enthusiasm to great size and power, but which is now a shell with many a sheltered spot within, where weak men may vegetate as clerks, perpetually referring matters from one to another, or strong men may be induced to trust to "the impulse of an early start," or to "interlocking directorates," or "banking control," or "dominating influence on the market," or to "predatory competition," or to anything else than service.

Perhaps the chief hinderance to the development of the scientific administrator in America will prove to be what we may call the danger of the entrenched position. The significance of this danger was long ago pointed out by Machiavelli, who warned his ideal prince of the harm wrought by strong fortresses. His words, written in 1513, are still full of significance. He said,

Whenever either princes or republics are afraid lest their subjects should revolt, it results mainly from the hatred of the subjects on account of the bad treatment experienced from those who govern them; and this comes either from the belief that they can best be controlled by force, or from lack of sound judgment in governing them. And one of the things that induce the belief that they can be controlled by force is the possession of fortresses with which to menace them; and thus the ill treatment that engenders hatred in the subjects arises in great measure from the fact that the prince or republic hold the fortresses, which (if this be true) are therefore by far more injurious than useful. For, in the first instance, they cause you to be more violent and audacious towards your subjects; and next, they do not afford the security which you imagine.

And, further, he says: