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 him as basing his philosophical system on metaphysical speculations regarding the Unknowable, and as the author of an unknowable philosophy. The article on "German Darwinism" rings many changes on this gross misrepresentation.

The writer says that evolution is regarded by Darwin "as a theorem of natural history," while Mr. Spencer treats of evolution "as a philosophical thesis deductively, and as a part of a system of metaphysics;" and furthermore, "a system like Mr. Spencer's is obliged to stand on such positions," namely, "undemonstrated beliefs." Again, he says, "Evolution is, with Mr. Spencer, not a theorem of inductive science, but a necessary truth deduced from axioms." These statements—is it not almost needless to say it?—are altogether groundless. Mr. Spencer's system never could have taken the hold of the cultivated scientific mind of half a dozen nations in the present age, which it confessedly has, if the above characterization of it were true. Speaking of an important research of Mr. Spencer, the President of the Royal Society of London, when addressing the British Association, said: "I need dwell no further on it here than to quote it as an example of what may be done by an acute observer and experimentalist, versed in physics and chemistry, but above all thoroughly instructed in scientific methods." Testimony like this, that Mr. Spencer, whatever may be his shortcomings, is a master of scientific methods, might be accumulated to any extent. Is it probable or conceivable that a man so thoroughly equipped for their use should repudiate the sound and solid methods of science, and fly off into baseless speculation when dealing with the most comprehensive and important scientific problem of our time? The thing is absurd unless it is proved, and the author of "German Darwinism" stops with mere dogmatic assertion.

We aver, on the other hand, that the scope of Mr. Spencer's great argument for evolution is only equaled by the fidelity and completeness of his adherence throughout to the established canons of scientific inquiry, and his reputation as a master of true logical method is beyond doubt mainly due to his practical application of it in the construction of his system. In "First Principles" the law of evolution is placed upon the most comprehensive inductive basis; and, if we go back to the earlier enunciation of his views, we find the law propounded with no reference whatever to metaphysical speculations. The original form of the conception and the order of its development are seen in the essay on "Progress, its Law and Cause." There is here not a word of metaphysics, not a word implying the endeavor to derive the phenomena from the persistence of force, not a shadow of foundation for the alleged theologico-metaphysical origin of the doctrine. The first part of the essay is devoted entirely to establishing the induction, from all orders of phenomena, that every thing progresses in heterogeneity; and then, the induction having been established as universal, the second part of the essay is an inquiry into the dynamical law which determines it in all cases. This second part sets out thus: "And now from this uniformity of procedure may we not infer some fundamental necessity whence it results? May we not rationally seek for some all-pervading process of things? Does not the universality of the law imply a universal cause?" And then the course of the argument is, first, to show that the cause alleged, the multiplication of effects, affords a deductive interpretation of the induction previously established. Are we to be told that this is an illegitimate scientific procedure?

The author of "German Darwinism" pronounces Spencer unscientific and unbaconian, because he employs the deductive or a priori method. But