Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 76.djvu/117

Rh a ship finds its position by means of observations with the sextant, or when an engineer constructs a dynamo with the aid of a drawing and data known to be correct, he does not engage in scientific thought, although he makes use of experience previously collected. When the computer in the office of the Nautical Almanac computes an eclipse of the moon, foretelling it to a second of time several years before the event, he is not engaged in scientific thought, but is making use of technical skill. When, on the other hand, Adams and Leverrier, computing the positions of the planet Uranus, found them not verified in fact, but by the assumption of a new hypothesis, were able to discover the planet Neptune, they were engaged in scientific thought of a high order. The collection of facts, as one collects postage stamps or coins, does not constitute science. In order to have science the facts must be fitted into a definite system, in accordance with a classification on the basis of what we call laws. It is a prerequisite for the existence of any science whatever that we admit that nature is subject to uniformity, that is, that similar circumstances of similar things will be followed by similar results. The belief that the order of nature is reasonable, that is, that there is a correspondence between her ways and our thoughts, and that this correspondence can be found out, is what I have called scientific faith. The method of the inductive sciences, those that concern the facts of nature, is first to observe a class of seemingly related facts in order to find out what they have in common, then if possible to form some hypothesis as to their relation, then to compare the different cases with the hypothesis in order to see whether it is justified. When this process has been successfully carried out, we arc able to predict what will occur in given circumstances, although these circumstances have not occurred. This is what we mean by discovering a law of nature, namely, finding a common property of a class of phenomena, such that under all circumstances the phenomena which will ensue can be described. This is what constitutes the difference between scientific and technical thought. Technical knowledge enables us to deal with cases that have occurred before, while scientific knowledge enables us to deal with what has not occurred before.

This is a matter that is not always understood in this country. It is a matter of common knowledge that this country stands very high in technical knowledge, but it is not so often pointed out that her contribution to science has as yet been distressingly small. Numerous examples might be given. We have just been celebrating the anniversary of Fulton's steamboat, with well-deserved enthusiasm. Nevertheless we must remember that Fulton did not invent the steamboat, nor did he construct the first one. He combined knowledge then existing with practical sense and business acumen, and was able to build a