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Rh, rather than of earnest truth-seeking. Its general acceptance would have debauched the true spirit of science. . . . The ground must first be cleared. . . and an insuperable obstacle to hearty rational acceptance must first be removed, and an inductive basis laid." This last, Le Conte goes on to argue, was largely the work of Agassiz, opponent of evolutionism though he was. Now, it is, of course, undeniable that the premature adoption of a hypothesis is a sin against the scientific spirit, and that the chance acceptance by some enthusiast of a truth in which, at the time, he has no sound reason for believing, by no means entitles him to any place of honor in the history of science. But what constitutes prematurity in this particular matter? And was the evolutionary hypothesis "contrary to the facts of science, as known and understood" at any time after 1840?

The prevalent belief that it was is chiefly due to two things. The first is the fact that before 1859 few English naturalists of high standing accepted, and almost none publicly avowed, the theory of descent; whereas, after the publication of the "Origin," such notable names as Huxley, Lyell, Hooker and Asa Gray were speedily numbered among the disciples of the doctrine, and in the ensuing five years it was well upon its way towards its eventual complete triumph. The other source of the supposition that Darwin presented the first adequate grounds for believing in evolution is the express testimony of Huxley, whose paper on the reception of the "Origin of Species" has come to be the principal source of information on its subject. In that article, and in several letters and other writings, Huxley takes credit to himself for his rejection of the transformation-theory until he became acquainted with Darwin's work; and he never expressed any sentiment far short of contempt for Chambers's "Vestiges." He wrote in 1887:

I must have read the "Vestiges". . . before 1846; but if I did, the book made very little impression on me, and I was not brought into serious contact with the "species" question until after 1850. . . . It seemed to me then, as now, that "creation," in the ordinary sense of the word, is perfectly conceivable. . . . I had not then, and have not now, the smallest a priori objection to raise to the account of the creation of plants and animals given in "Paradise Lost." . . . Far be it from me to say that it is untrue because it is impossible. I confine myself to what must be regarded as a modest and reasonable request—for some particle of evidence that the existing species of animals and plants did originate in that way, as a condition of my belief in a statement which appears to me highly improbable. And, by way of being perfectly fair, I had exactly the same answer to give to the evolutionists of 1851-58. . . . The only person known to me whose knowledge and capacity compelled respect, and who was, at the same time, a thorough-going evolutionist, was Mr. Herbert Spencer. . . . But even my friend's rare dialectic skill and copiousness of apt illustration could not drive me from my agnostic position. I took my stand upon two grounds: Firstly, that at the time the evidence in favor of transmutation was wholly insufficient; secondly, that no suggestion respecting the causes of the