Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 74.djvu/11

Rh late as 1895 by the London editor of McClure's Magazine to contribute to that journal, he replied:

I have, in virtue mainly of my indebtedness to my old friend for all he did on my behalf in the United States, felt bound to make the Popular Science Monthly my sole medium for publication of articles in the United States, and the obligation, which was preemptory during his life, remains strong after his death, since his brother occupies his place and he has continued his good offices on my behalf.

The choice of a spokesman is less happy, but when we remember that the brothers Youmans, John Fiske, and most of the other disciples of Spencer in America have passed away, the difficulty in finding a proper person for such a task will be appreciated. Probably it should have fallen to an unqualified disciple who would simply pronounce an éloge in some extended form. The one to whom it has been assigned, while he yields to none in his high estimate of Spencer's talents and achievements, and has made this known on many occasions, has remained eclectic as to his peculiar doctrines, accepting such as appeal to him as sound, rejecting those which seem to be obviously unsound, and suspending judgment as to many that appear doubtful or await sufficient evidence.

In these several respects it is possible to classify Spencer's views under two heads and to explain the reasons which assign them to the one or the other class. The first class includes his cosmic philosophy in general, beginning with inorganic nature and extending through biology. It also includes much of his psychology, anthropology and sociology, considered in their philosophic aspects. The second class embraces his ethics as a whole, both individual and political. To it also belong most of the applications that he makes of psychology and sociology to current events, his dealings with the state, government, war, industry, business and economic problems. While no one will go so far as to say that his views on the first of these classes are always sound, or that those on the second are always unsound or questionable, it is still true that all that is great and profound in his philosophy belongs to the first of these classes, while his errors, his narrow views, and his unworthy utterances are confined to the second class.

And now as to the explanation of this. Primarily it rests on the fact that in treating the first class of subjects there was no room for the play of the emotions, while the subjects of the second class often appeal to the feelings, and Spencer, with all his logic and philosophic poise, never had his feelings under complete subjection to his reason. But secondarily, in the case of topics appealing to the feelings he unfortunately imbibed a whole series of prejudices during his early youth from which he was never able to free himself. Indeed, they were so