Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 67.djvu/151

Rh The same point of view should be maintained when we come to the next division of logic— the study of propositions. Here, likewise, the meaning side of language, and not the form, is of primary interest. Many students have difficulty in realizing that the meaning of a proposition does not depend upon its form; that affirmative, or negative, or categorical forms are not necessarily expressions of affirmative, or negative, or categorical thoughts. For example, the last clause of the verse, 'Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life; and few there be that find it' is very frequently interpreted as meaning 'some do find it'

In this connection there is another not uncommon error, namely, that of regarding two propositions, worded differently, as different assertions, when, in fact, they assert the same thing.

But traditional logic is of little help in the whole matter of logical analysis. For instance, its treatment of conversion makes dry reading and a perfunctory task for the student. It is even worse; it savors of the artificial and useless. That a subject of such importance as conversion should be presented in a way so unnatural and forbidding as that of the traditional logic is much to be regretted. Logic should teach in this matter, not traditional rules, nor discussions of formal subtleties, but the simple truth that the Tightness or wrongness of every converse rests on precisely the same basis as that of the original proposition, namely, known facts and laws. The proposition that ignorant people are superstitious is true because it agrees with the facts. But if we change it into superstitious people are ignorant we do not get a good converse, because this proposition does not agree with the facts. In the next place, the syllogism needs more radical change in treatment than either of the two previously mentioned divisions of so-called deductive logic. The traditional treatment has overloaded the subject with dry discussions, rules and symbolical schemes, so that there is hardly left the slightest appearance of any connection with actual thinking. Better omit all mention of figure, mood, reduction, and the question whether there are three or four figures, than miss the important lesson of the syllogism. "There is little," says Mr. Sidgwick, "that need be taught about the syllogism, since the process itself — which is merely that of bringing a particular case under a general rule—is used instinctively by every one from childhood onwards."

Examples like these, (Five francs are a dollar, four shillings are a dollar; therefore five francs are four shillings'; or, 'Some men are not fools, yet all men are fallible' are not suited to bring out the real 'process' much less to train the mind in accurately applying a general truth to a particular case. In fact, too many of the arguments selected