Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 67.djvu/150

144 mind a comprehension of its scope and purpose as concrete as possible. I can think of no better way of accomplishing this than by stating at the outset that the business of logic is to formulate and systematically present the methods of our thinking for the purpose of acquiring knowledge of the correct methods and skill in their use. This would make logic a science, treating its subject matter descriptively rather than philosophically.

Then proceeding to what is properly the first division of logic, namely, the study of words or terms, it should be made clear that logic treats language from the standpoint of meaning. In reality, logic, so far as its discussion of terms and propositions extends, is one of the trinity of subjects which have to do with the use of language. Its relation to grammar and rhetoric may be best made clear by regarding as the primary interest of logic the function of words as expressing the thought of the speaker or writer. Of course, logical analysis is inseparable from the correct teaching of grammar and rhetoric. But the actual practise is frequently such as to warrant the criticism that sense is sacrificed to grammatical and rhetorical niceties. One is also reminded of that portion of Mr. Huxley's criticism of the teaching of English literature at Oxford, where he writes: "I venture to doubt the wisdom of attempting to mold one's style by any other process than that of striving after clear and forcible expression of definite conceptions; in which process the Glassian precept, 'first catch your conceptions,' is probably the most difficult to obey."

If students take up logic with the idea, carried over from their study of grammar and their use of dictionaries, that words get their character as nouns, or verbs, or what not, from their origin or form, they should be made to understand early that it is quite an erroneous idea. "The logical character of a name is not something fixed and stable, but quite the reverse. It is function, not structure, that determines logical character, and the function of words in asserting is variable. The different actual uses of names are what logic needs to distinguish, not different sorts of names apart from their actual use, words in their context, not words as grammar conceives them or as they lie side by side in a dictionary. . . . Since words are adaptable instruments of assertion, and not restricted to a single function, we might as well ask whether a penny stamp in the pocket is a receipt stamp or a postage stamp, as ask whether a word apart from its particular use has this or that logical character." The logical treatment of terms is essentially the question of how they are used in this or that connection.