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618 of natural phenomena. In the social sphere the principle rests upon observed effects, and is an induction from the facts belonging to that sphere, just as strictly as the law of organic evolution is derived from facts in the biological field. This is abundantly shown in "First Principles," where the law, as applied to society, rests upon its own independent basis, and not upon the analogy of the social to the individual organism. So far, indeed, from proceeding by the method stated by Prof. Cairnes, Mr. Spencer actually proceeded by the reverse method: instead of beginning with biology and carrying out his conclusions to be applied to society, he began first, and early in life, the direct study of social phenomena, and pursued that line of inquiry many years before taking up biology. With Prof. Cairnes's criticism of the "analogy" we have nothing to do; nor is it of any importance that Huxley and Spencer had a controversy about it. The question is as old as Plato, and both Cairnes and Huxley admit that the analogy has some value—Mr. Spencer never claimed for it any thing more. We only say that the use the reviewer makes of it proves that he has taken but little pains to inform himself of Mr. Spencer's real doctrines.

Let us now consider Prof. Cairnes's main ground of attack upon Spencer's theory of social evolution. Calling attention to the fact that the social condition of the largest portion of the human race is stationary, and that there are numerous examples of social retrogression, he charges Mr. Spencer with ignoring these facts because they have no place in his theory of evolution. We have now, he says, three thousand years of history, and "surely, before propounding his speculation as a law of human society, from which he is at once justified in deducing consequences of the largest kind bearing upon human conduct, Mr. Spencer was bound to consider what amount of countenance or support it received from the evidence derivable from such fields of research; but from the application of this test he has wholly abstained" (the italics are ours). And, after referring to the backward movement of human affairs in Europe, for many centuries, he adds that "the verdict of history, as now understood by its most competent interpreters, is distinctly opposed to the theory of social evolution enunciated by Mr. Spencer. Now, this is a fact that has been completely ignored by that distinguished writer: he has simply passed it by as not concerning his argument; and, in doing so, has, as I contend, set at naught one of the best-understood canons of the inductive method." These passages, and the whole argument in which their thought is expanded, simply show (if we may be allowed to speak plainly) that Prof. Cairnes does not know what he is talking about. His statements are squarely against all the facts. So far is it from being true that Mr. Spencer ignores history in his social theories, that he has made the most elaborate and extensive preparations in this direction for future use in working out the principles of sociology. Nor were these preparations mere projects yet to be executed. The facts of the sociological history of England, on a most comprehensive plan, had been collated, and organized, and published a year and a half, when Prof. Cairnes comes forward to charge him with neglecting history. The professor, indeed, seems not to have the faintest idea of Mr. Spencer's real attitude toward his subject. Had he examined the work just referred to, which was his bounden duty as a reviewer, he would have discovered that, so far from ignoring history in social affairs, Mr. Spencer is doing more than any other man to bring it forward and give it its true place in the scientific study of society. He would have found that, of the three great social groups into which the human race is divided by Mr.