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414 when we make none, though I see no reason why such a circuitous mode of action should be adopted. But, though the consciousness of making an effort is not conclusive as to the actual making, still, as it is of internal phenomena, it is evidence of a higher order than that which consciousness of a sensation gives as to the existence or character of the external phenomena.

The senses through which the external is presented may not act perfectly; and this, as compared with the consciousness of internal phenomena, makes an additional risk of error similar to that which arises from seeing an object through glass or in the reflection of a mirror, instead of directly without any intervening medium.

Those, then, who set up physical phenomena against our conscious ness of effort, labor under the disadvantage of impeaching the accuracy of the testimony by other testimony which is less reliable than that which they impeach.

Prof. Huxley admits that men and other animals know and feel. The existence, then, of that for which power by effort is claimed as an attribute, with these prerequisites to its exercise, is admitted.

On the other hand, any belief in matter or in its motion is but an inference from our sensations which, as we have seen, is not a necessary or conclusive inference; and hence we have no reliable evidence of the existence of matter, nor of the attributes which, if it exists, are essential to its having power.

In the first case, we know the existence of the active agent; its feeling, subjecting it to want; and its knowledge, enabling it to adopt a mode of gratifying its want, which are all the elements which are requisite to the exercise of a power by effort, and though we have no conclusive proof that it actually makes the effort, the testimony in regard to this, for reasons already stated, is more reliable than the inferences from our sensations, that matter exists, and that it moves, and that one portion impinges on another portion, all of which are essential to material causation. In the first case, the existence of the agent, with all the prerequisites to the exercise of power, is known. In the latter, not a single one of them is known. This shows that the material phenomena which Prof. Huxley presents are not, in this case, sufficient to rebut the testimony of consciousness that we do will—do make effort, and thereby produce change.

The further question, Do we ourselves determine our efforts? is identical with that of our freedom in willing, which I do not propose here to discuss, but will remark that it is not probable, perhaps it is not conceivable, that any unintelligent agent should create the whole system of wants, knowledge, and the application of knowledge involved in an effort, as just stated, and impress the whole as illusions on the mind of the actor; nor yet, that any blind force should direct the effort in exact conformity to the wishes and the preconceptions of the manner and the effect which are in the thoughts of him who has