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104 school in Britain and the United States dates, is always welcome. And, even if scientific students lay up old scores against him for his attack on Huxley, and for his more recent, suggestive, though unfair assault on the Darwinians, they must remember that he represents one type of contemporary thinking favored by a large and influential group; they must remember, too, that he was trained as a physician and has competent first-hand knowledge of the scientific standpoint. The present work—'What Is Thought,' published by the Blacks in Edinburgh, and imported by the Scribners—although highly metaphysical, in the Hegelian sense, contains not a little interesting material. The early chapters, on 'Substance,' the 'Ontological Proof,' 'Self-consciousness,' and the like, summarize views familiar to philosophical students, and known more or less to scientific men through such books as Prof. Ritchie's 'Darwin and Hegel,' and Prof. Watson's 'Kant and his English Critics.' Fortunately, these chapters occupy but a third of the volume. The three hundred pages devoted to some account of the development from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, to Hegel, are more important, and present, in some aspects, the best statement of the subject at present available in English. The long chapter on Kant is full of points demanding consideration from thoughtful scientific workers; while the estimate of the relations between Schelling and Hegel must be held of exceptional value. No doubt, the book is hard reading; all Dr. Sterling's works are, for he has never been able to rid himself of the curious Carlylese style that so strongly marked his first, and greatest, effort. Nevertheless, all the old vigor and all the power remain. It may be added that the book appeals very specially to students of the history of European thought in the nineteenth century a subject which, particularly as concerns the relation between the sciences and philosophy, is very far from being understood as yet.

is not easy to speak of the English translation from the German version of the Danish original of Höffding's 'History of Philosophy.' Professor Höffding's work is admirable, as all know; the translation—well, the less said of it, the better. We dismiss it with but one comment. The most laughable of the translator's numerous errors happens to be venial, as too many others are not. He tells us that Geulinex died at Pesth. Knowing of the Dutch philosopher's sojourn in Lyons, but being in ignorance of a visit to Pesth, one naturally turned to the original, and found Höffding recording that Geulinex died of the plague (pest)! This is fit companion for the similar error (now classical) whereby the Wolffian psychology (wolffischen Psychlogie) was Englished as animal psychology. Pest and Pesth obviously bear much the same relation to each other as Wolff and wolf! This may be sublime, it is hardly translation. One may venture to express a hope that the publishers will see to a thorough revision by a competent hand. The work is far too important to be left thus; moreover, we are unaccustomed to associate such a performance with the house of Macmillan. As compared with other histories of philosophy, Höffding's possesses quite peculiar attractions for those whose main interests lie in the direction of science. The space at disposal compels the briefest statement of these points. In the first place, then, Höffding devotes great attention to the formation and import of the Renaissance view of the universe. He bears it specially in mind that this view was evolved as much, if not more, by science than by philosophy. Consequently, Copernicus, Galileo and Newton take their places alongside Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz. The importance of this method of treatment can hardly be exaggerated to-day. For one of the main problems at the moment is nothing more than a determination of the extent to which 'modern thought' is still controlled by