Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 50.djvu/181

Rh was this recognition of the dependence of sociology upon biology." Moreover a subsequent sentence runs thus:—

"In the first place, all social actions being determined by the actions of individuals, and all actions of individuals being vital actions that conform to the laws of life at large, rational interpretation of social actions implies knowledge of the laws of life."

But though these passages seem to support the interpretation of my views which I repudiate, yet on looking at the context it will be seen that this is not so. For, as shown by preceding and succeeding passages, "the laws of life at large," as here understood, are laws comprehensive of both bodily life and mental life. Though, as I have conspicuously shown, I do not, like M. Comte, merge psychology in biology—though, under its objective aspect, I regard it as a science clearly marked off, and under its subjective aspect as a science fundamentally contrasted with all others; yet, as every one must do, I admit that the science of mind is dependent on the science of life. For we know nothing whatever of mind save as exhibited by living bodies. That by "laws of life at large" I mean laws of bodily life and mental life taken together, is, indeed, clearly implied by the use of the words "the actions of individuals," as being dependent on these laws of life; since the actions of individuals are all mentally determined. But there are set forth in the chapter named, certain direct dependencies of social phenomena on vital phenomena. It is said that the sociologist must learn "the laws of modification to which organized beings in general conform"; that he must recognize the effects of use and disuse in causing increase and decrease of bodily and mental powers; that he must remember how, as a consequence, human nature "is always adapting itself both directly and indirectly to its conditions of existence"; and that he must bear in mind the truth that "every species of creature goes on multiplying till it reaches the limit at which its mortality from all causes balances its fertility," so that taking away one cause of mortality by and by entails intensification of other causes arising from increased pressure of population. Against this evidence, however, has to be set the evidence contained in the next chapter, which shows the still more important dependencies of sociology upon psychology, and ends with the conclusion that "without preparation in mental science there can be no social science."

But the small regard paid to all the proofs given at the outset that the psychic factors of social phenomena are by me considered the predominant ones, appears to have resulted from thinking only of the parallelism I have asserted between certain traits of individual organisms and certain traits of social organisms. Prof. Giddings writes:—