Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 40.djvu/282

270 that is best in the society of the time. The true strong man as we conceive him will have no greed for power; his greed, if such it may be called, will be for usefulness; and he will show his strength by his willingness to retire at any moment from a public to a private position rather than prove unfaithful to his convictions or do anything unworthy of a man of honor. Strictly speaking, a man who with adequate knowledge and intelligence tries faithfully to serve the public can never be obscure, though offices should not seek him nor caucuses make mention of his name. The public at large will recognize and honor his efforts, and his influence may be greater in a private station than that of a score of average legislators. We do not, however, look to our educational institutions to do much to develop this new type of citizen; we trust rather to general educative influences that are abroad in the world. We trust, we may say, in a considerable degree to such writings as those of Mr. Spencer, instinct as they are with noble views of liberty and of justice, and conveying at the same time clear and enlightened ideas regarding the nature and functions of the state. It is possible that private associations for the purpose of causing more intelligent views of citizenship and its duties to prevail might accomplish very good work; and we hope that something may be attempted in this way in connection with the University Extension movement which is now making so satisfactory progress. We certainly do not at this moment know of any more useful work in which an intelligent man could engage, than this of introducing a scientific element, however feeble at first, into the chaotic welter of our State and national politics.

is singular what difficulty many intelligent persons experience in entertaining the idea that in a democracy there can be political injustice. "What possible means can you suggest," we are often asked, "of deciding political questions save the vote of the majority? And what ground can any one have to complain so long as he exercises the franchise with the rest? The minority can not expect to rule, can it?" These questions all proceed upon the assumption that there can not be a moral element in any political question; whereas, in point of fact, there is a moral element in every political question. If two partners were trying to arrange the terms of a separation, and each in the most shameless manner were to set at naught all considerations of equity, and strive only to get the largest possible amount out of the business for himself, we should scarcely approve of the proceeding. Every one feels that equity has something to say in such a matter. If any property whatever had to be divided, and if, instead of bringing considerations of right to bear, the parties were at once to plunge into a squabble with no guiding principle whatever save individual greed, we should think as meanly of their intelligence as of their honesty. We all feel instinctively that wherever moral principle can furnish a guide it should furnish a guide—in other words, that to decide any question without reference to moral grounds which admits of being settled on moral grounds is a gross offense against both morality and common sense. Supposing, then, that some one who had banded himself with others to carry by force a decision involving injustice to a minority—say of stockholders—should impudently say, "We had the votes and we used them"—our only conclusion would be that he was a hardy and cynical villain. Things of this kind have sometimes been done; but for the most part vice has at least paid to virtue the tribute of hypocrisy.

To bring this home to the question before us, the nation is a great corporation and the citizens are shareholders. A general election is a meeting of the