Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 39.djvu/871

Rh it is pointed out that "the end to be achieved by the society in its corporate capacity, that is, by the state, is the welfare of its units; for the society having as an aggregate no sentiency, its preservation is a desideratum only as subserving individual sentiencies." This is a most important principle, which should always modify the modern evolutionary conception of society as an organism, and prevent that subordination of the individual which must result from the application of socialistic principles to governmental affairs. The modern state, Mr. Spencer shows, is in process of evolution from the militant type, in which successful aggressive activities demand and develop the principle of centralization, toward the industrial type, based upon contract. In its final development the constitution of the state "appropriate to that industrial type of society in which equity is fully realized, must be one in which there is not a representation of individuals but a representation of interests. For the health of the social organism and the welfare of its members, a balance of functions is requisite; and this balance can not be maintained by giving to each function a power proportionate to the number of functionaries." This principle, which constitutes, perhaps, the most suggestive and original part of Mr. Spencer's discussion of governmental methods, will doubtless meet with much opposition and criticism in our own and similarly constituted communities. It is evidently, however, the product of a most careful study of existing societies, and a judicial consideration of their obvious merits and defects. It is worthy of the thoughtful attention of all students of society and government.

In discussing the duties of the state, Mr. Spencer argues that as societies advance from the militant toward the industrial type, state functions will be less and less adapted to repelling external aggressors and more and more to the maintenance of the conditions of justice against the assaults of internal enemies—the ignorant, vicious, and depraved, who constitute abnormal elements in all large societies. For the better fulfillment of this obligation, he believes it to be the duty of the state to administer justice without cost—to arbitrate between citizens gratuitously. His arguments in this behalf, and replies to anticipated objections, are forceful and worthy of the serious attention of our statesmen and philosophers. A further duty of the state is to act as trustee for the supervision of the inhabited territory, with reference to the building of roadways, canals, and railroads; the establishment and repair of water, gas, telegraph, and kindred appliances, etc. The actual introduction and maintenance of public works should, however, usually be left to private enterprise. The paternal theory of government contradicts the fundamental principles of justice by introducing into the state the contrary ethics of the family. "The only justification for the analogy between parent and child and government and people," he says, "is the childishness of the people who entertain the analogy" (page 217).

No candid and thoughtful man, unbiased by socialistic preconceptions, can read the concluding chapters of this book without being convinced that the true progress of governmental institutions must lie along the lines which Mr. Spencer has indicated. The philosophical evolutionist can but agree with him that "all-embracing state-functions characterize a low social type; and progress to a higher social type is marked by a relinquishment of functions" (page 230). The vices and inefficiencies of the civil service, so lucidly described in these chapters, are defects of our American institutions no less than of those of the mother-country. Wherever they exist they are largely due to the failure to comprehend and apply the fundamental principles of equity and justice, so well defined by Mr. Spencer. So far as these false methods are defensible at all, they are habitually defended by arguments avowedly based on considerations of custom and immediate utility. It should be evident, however, none the less to us than to Mr. Spencer, that "this empirical utilitarianism, which makes happiness the immediate end, stands in contrast with the rational utilitarianism, which aims at the fulfillment of the conditions of happiness." The excellence and sufficiency of Mr. Spencer's ethical theory nowhere appeal so conclusively to the enlightened understanding as under the crucial test of its practical applications. The thoughtful moralist who is thoroughly acquainted with the facts of our existing societary conditions can hardly avoid the conclusion thus