Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 38.djvu/425

Rh have to admit that he is a more suitable subject for a severely authoritative regime than for any system of intellectual and moral liberty. Such a man doubtless needs the most alluring inducements on the one hand, and the direst threatenings on the other, to keep him from frequent transgressions. Not that the transgressions themselves would not in many cases entail punishments which, had they been foreseen, would have deterred him from misconduct, but simply because when a man is so constituted that, without any prepossession in favor of right-doing, he calculates over again on each occasion the probable consequences of a given act, the voice of present passion or desire is very apt to dominate all other pleas. Such a man is a mere moral pauper, starving himself on "beggarly elements," instead of nourishing himself and building himself up on well-developed moral principles. Long before Mr. Spencer, the English philosopher Hobbes dealt very well with this point. "The fool hath said in his heart there is no such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging that, every man's conservation and contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's own benefit." After thus stating the case of "the fool," Hobbes goes on to point out that such a man takes up a position of hostility to society, and therefore "can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power," and "can not be received in any society that unite themselves for peace and defense, but by the error of them that receive him." His conclusion is that "justice is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of Nature."

The fool who says in his heart that there is no such thing as justice is generally enough of a knave not to say it aloud; and so far he pays homage to what he recognizes as a settled conviction of mankind. The science of ethics teaches us how conduct becomes ethical in its character, through what successively higher stages it passes, and wherein a true moral equilibrium consists. It can do no more. It is for every man to determine for himself how far he is influenced or means to be influenced by the knowledge that certain courses of action make for the elevation of his own character and the benefit of the world, while others make in an entirely opposite direction. If any man declares that such a manifestation of the truth influences him not at all, it would be well for him to seek the restraints and persuasives of some other system; or, if he means to enter upon a war against society, to take his measures with the greatest caution. It is some satisfaction to think that, among those who take the scientific view of ethics, there is rather more inclination of the heart toward what is right than among those who reject that view chiefly on the ground of its too feeble sanctions. "K." himself seems to admit this, and, if so, we do not see why he should feel discouraged. In conclusion, we may say that, if we have not fully met our correspondent's difficulties, we shall be happy to return to the subject, and deal as specifically as possible with any point he may suggest for discussion. We say this, not because there are not many other questions claiming attention, but because we are strongly convinced that there is not to-day a more important issue than this of the soundness and sufficiency of the evolutionary view of ethics.

This is a thing a good deal talked about, but which does not bear very close investigation. All work, all effort must have an object; otherwise it is not determined to any end, guided in