Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 37.djvu/282

270 that he should not have used such words.

Up to this point we have been examining what Dr. Hill offers as his proofs that Herbert Spencer advises us "to follow our own interest without concern for others"; it remains now to glance at a few of the numerous passages which show in the most positive and conclusive manner that Herbert Spencer holds no such principle as that imputed to him, but, on the contrary, earnestly desires that we should concern ourselves for one another, and that sympathy should govern in all human relations. It is very singular indeed that these passages should have missed, if they did miss, Dr. Hill's scrutiny; and more singular still, if he was cognizant of them, that he should not have considered that any of them had a bearing on the question at issue. We must devote the remainder of our space mainly to quotations. To show what he understands by moral motives, Mr. Spencer says (Data of Ethics, page 121): "The man who is moved by a moral feeling to help another in difficulty, does not picture to himself any reward here or hereafter, but pictures only the better condition he is trying to bring about. One who is morally prompted to fight against a social evil has neither material benefit nor popular applause before his mind; but only the mischiefs he seeks to remove, and the increased well-being which will follow their removal." Then take the following as indicating his ideal of social life: "A society is conceivable formed of men living perfectly inoffensive lives, scrupulously fulfilling their contracts, and efficiently rearing their offspring, who yet, yielding to one another no advantages beyond those agreed upon, fall short of that highest degree of life which the gratuitous rendering of services makes possible. . .. The limit of evolution of conduct is consequently not reached until, beyond avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to others, there are spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others" (Data of Ethics, page 147). "Sympathy is the root of both justice and benevolence" (do., page 148).

Any one wishing to know what scope Mr. Spencer allowed to the altruistic principle would naturally turn to the chapter in his Data of Ethics entitled Altruism versus Egoism. Dr. Hill did net find it in the interest of his argument to make any quotations from that chapter; we must, therefore, be allowed to produce a few: "That any one should have formulated his experience by saying that the conditions to success are a hard heart and a good digestion is marvelous, considering the many proofs that success, even of a material kind, greatly depending as it does on the good offices of others, is furthered by whatever creates good-will in others. The contrast between the prosperity of those who to but moderate abilities join natures which beget friendships by their kindliness, and the adversity of those who, though possessed of superior faculties and greater acquirements, arouse dislike by their hardness or indifference, should force upon all the truth that egoistic enjoyments are aided by altruistic actions. This increase of personal benefit achieved by benefiting others is but partly achieved where a selfish motive prompts the seemingly unselfish act; it is fully achieved only when-the act is really unselfish. . . . Those (services) which bring more than equivalents are those not prompted by any thoughts of equivalents. For obviously it is the spontaneous outflow of good nature, not in the larger acts of life only, but in all its details, w r hich generates in those around the attachments prompting unstinted benevolence" (page 211). Not bad for a man who is credited in an article written by a college president, and selected by a bishop for the reading of young people whose opinions are in course of formation, with advising us "to follow our own interest without concern for others"! Not so bad this either: "If we contrast early poetry, occupied mainly