Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 36.djvu/355

Rh Now, my friends and myself, having no better guides than common morality and common sense, are of opinion that, supposing Ivanhoe to have behaved in this scandalous fashion, the fact makes not the smallest difference in justice or in equity to the title of A. B.; and that, if it did, the State, which has contracted to defend A. B.'s title without the least reference to such antiquarian contingencies, would commit a gross fraud if it broke its contract on any such flimsy pretenses.

The right to compensation is not in question; what we deny is the right to disturb A. B. on such a ground.

It would appear, however, that there is some better guidance than that of common morality and common sense; "absolute political ethics" is an infallible indicator of what we ought to do whether the action indicated is possible or impossible.

Now, what we want is this very light as to what we ought to do in such a concrete case as that I have mentioned. The dictum that "ownership established by force does not stand on the same footing as ownership established by contract," I must repeat, "does not help us." Construed strictly, it is a mere truism; construed broadly, it may cover Mr. Laidler's view.

What we want to know is this: According to "absolute political ethics," has A. B. a moral as well as a legal right to his land or not?

If he has not, how does "absolute political ethics" deduce his title to compensation? And, if he has, how does "absolute political ethics" deduce the State's right to disturb him?

No question is raised here as to the right of the State to deal with A. B.'s land or anything else he possesses on grounds of public utility or necessity; nor do we want to know what may be done by the wisdom or the folly of future generations. "Absolute political ethics" should be independent of time and space; and it ought to be able to tell us whether, in foro conscientiæ, A. B., if he continue to hold his land under the circumstances supposed, is an honest man or a receiver of stolen goods.

I intervene in this discussion most unwillingly, but I have long been of opinion that the great political evil of our time is the attempt to sanction popular acts of injustice by antiquarian and speculative arguments.

My friend Mr. Spencer is, I am sure, the last person willingly to abet this tendency. But I am afraid that, in spite of all Mr. Spencer's disclaimers, the next time Mr. Morley visits his constituents his pertinacious "heckler" will insist that, after all, the younger and the older philosopher are not disagreed in principle; and that the difference of "footing" between ownership primarily based on force and other ownership can not be cured by efflux of time, and justifies the State now, or at any future period, in dealing differently with the two.