Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 33.djvu/283

Rh between "Nature" and the "supernatural." By the "supernatural" is commonly understood a region beyond the visible universe of law, peopled by arbitrary intelligences which may descend into the natural order, and interrupt its sequence, either for good or for ill. Mr. Thompson's "supernatural," on the contrary, is clearly neither more nor less than the philosophical "unknowable"—the ultimate mystery lying behind phenomena, the only possible knowledge of which is a negative apprehension.

We might question also whether this definition is sufficiently inclusive. How, for example, can Mr. Thompson consistently assign a religious character to positivism, which finds its object of worship wholly within the natural order of the world; or to Dr. Abbot's "scientific theism," which rejects not only the popular notion of the supernatural, but also the Spencerian "unknowable," basing its worship upon the knowledge of an infinitely relational and absolutely knowable universe? Mr. Thompson, indeed, apparently recognizes positivism as "the religion of social immortality," asserting that "the doctrine of deity characteristically belonging to this system of belief is essentially pantheistic." Comteism, however, expressly repudiates all cosmic implications in the object of its worship—its Grand Être being simply organic humanity. Even pantheism, as limited to the Cosmos, does not imply supernaturalism. Rather, as in the words of Goethe, it repudiates it:

 What were the God who sat outside to scan The spheres that 'neath his finger circling ran? God dwells within, and moves the world and molds, Himself and Nature in one form infolds."

Mr. Thompson argues, indeed, with great acuteness and force, that "a postulated supernatural is conditional for all knowledge whatsoever." Those who accept his psychology will doubtless assent to this statement. A primary definition of religion, however, it would appear to us, should be broad enough to cover all philosophical theories.

Parts I and II ("Religion and Religious Sentiments," and "Religious Sentiments in Relation to Knowledge") are devoted chiefly to definition, preliminary explanation, and the development of the psychological basis of the argument. As this has been treated in extenso in the author's "System of Psychology," it does not call for special elucidation here. Throughout life, he argues, the ego perceives that its activity is necessarily limited. Beyond the limit the consciousness posits a somewhat which is real, yet incomprehensible. Thus arises the idea of the supernatural (unknowable). To the questions why? whence? and whither? which it suggests, we can find no adequate solution. Attempting to make the supernatural the object of thought, we find that we can only do so by ascribing to it the attributes of Nature. Thus, we form symbolical notions of it which vary with changing conditions of mental development. So arise anthropomorphic conceptions of supernatural beings, ideas of heaven and hell, the assumed connection of supernatural intelligences with natural phenomena, etc. This belief in supernatural interference induces fear, impels worship, and influences conduct.

Our author ranks polytheism above monotheism as an incentive to intellectual and social progress. The latter is autocratic and subverts the individual judgment. The former, aristocratic in its nature, stimulates thought and encourages literature and art. Christianity, with its Trinity and angelic hierarchy, he regards as a polytheistic rather than a monotheistic faith. Pantheism is democratic, and favors the free development of the individual reason. Between these different conceptions of the supernatural, truth furnishes no criterion of judgment. We can affirm of neither of them anything more than its probability.

In the chapter on "The Continuity of Personality," Mr. Thompson argues from scientific and psychological analogies in favor of a future life. Admitting that the subject is beset with difficulties, he inclines to the opinion that "the ground for the assertion of post-mortem personal self-consciousness in identity with ante-mortem self-consciousness is firmer than the contrary belief." A future life implies social relations, and the hypothesis of the separation of the good from the evil, with the final reclamation of the latter, seems reasonable. Our author furnishes no theories of his own concerning the nature or location of the supernatural world. In Part III ("Religious