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150 of discovery, or prevent it from drawing such conclusions as may seem reasonable from the facts that come within its range.

The second doctrine which the evolution hypothesis is solemnly warned not to contradict is that which affirms that "mankind has sinned and come short of the glory of God." Guilt and imperfection, we are told—and, as the present writer thinks, truly—are not synonymous. "Sin is always a fall; when we sin we go down from a higher to a lower life." Now, what the evolutionist is concerned to know, is whether he is required to affirm, or at the very least to refrain from denying, that man was originally created perfect, and that, from that condition of perfection, he fell by sin, more or less in the manner described in the third chapter of Genesis. Dr. Abbott is not as distinct upon this point as might be desired. Making all allowances for his natural desire to "leave severely alone doubtful interpretations of the third chapter of Genesis, and doubtful discussions respecting the origin of the race," we might still have expected him to tell us clearly whether he holds that the first human pair were created perfect—"very good" from every point of view—and whether this is what he requires the evolutionist also to believe. The latter might, I fear, have some trouble with a doctrine of this kind; but if he is merely asked to believe that there is a radical difference between guilt and imperfection, he will not only be able to toe the mark without difficulty, but, with the aid of Mr. Spencer, he will be able to discourse somewhat pertinently on the differences between guilt and imperfection. The sense of guilt arises, he will say, when some higher law of conduct, the moral authority of which has been established in the manner described in Chapter VII of the "Data of Ethics," has been set aside under the influence of some lower but more clamorous motive. Such lapses are incidental to man's upward struggle; and in every such case he undoubtedly has the sense of a fall. The illustrations which Dr. Abbott gives of his meaning lead to the belief that he understands nothing more by guilt than the falling away from some recognized standard, some attained level, of conduct. If so, he has gone out of his way to give a very unnecessary warning to his evolutionist brother. "Every broken resolve," he says, "every high purpose lowered, every sacrifice of reverence to sensual desire, of conscience to passion, of love to greed, or ambition, or wealth, is a fall." Surely no decently-read person supposes there is anything in the evolution philosophy that conflicts with this. What the evolutionist is in doubt about is whether the story of the Fall, as embodied in Christian doctrine, is a true story—whether the first human being was all made up of high purpose, reverence, conscience, and love, and whether from that pristine condition of purity he fell, by one act of disobedience, into that condition of utter corruption described by theologians. There is no use in mincing matters or using vague language. Either Dr. Abbott summons the evolutionist to incorporate this doctrine in his