Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 26.djvu/41

Rh its Law and Cause," and on "The Ultimate Laws of Physiology," published respectively in the "Westminster Review" and the "National Review" (not the periodical now bearing that title) in April and October, 1857, more than two years before the publication of "The Origin of Species." Another source was not very long since alleged by the Rev. Thomas Mozley. In his "Reminiscences," etc., when giving an account of the influence exercised over him by my father, of whom he was a pupil, he describes himself as deriving from my father certain ideas which led him to think out a philosophy of like general nature with that set forth by me; but when, after enumerating the cardinal ideas of the Synthetic Philosophy, I requested him to point out any one of them which was contained in his own "elder philosophy," as he called it, he did not do so, and said all he meant by "family likeness" was such family likeness as might be alleged between "Cardinal Newman's view and his brother Frank's." And now comes Mr. Harrison, repeating the assertion made twenty years ago, and then refuted by me, that I am indebted to Comte—nay, that I owe to him "all the idées-merès" of the Synthetic Philosophy. These three different beliefs concerning its origin go a long way toward destroying one another. Each by implication contradicting the other two is itself contradicted by them; and being thus severally discredited, they might, perhaps, safely be left as they stand. But readers of Mr. Harrison's address might not consider this sufficient, and I must therefore deal with his statement directly.

In the first sentence of that statement he refers to a brochure entitled "The Classification of the Sciences; to which are added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte," originally published in March, 1864. In this I have set down not such "divergences" as might consist with partial acceptance, which Mr. Harrison's statement may lead readers to suppose, but I have given "reasons for dissenting from," and rejecting, Comte's philosophy altogether. I have enumerated six cardinal propositions essentially characterizing the Positive Philosophy, and have set against them six counter-propositions which I hold. I have then gone on to say:

"Leaving out of his 'Exposition' those pre-established general doctrines which are the common property of modern thinkers, these are the general doctrines which remain—these are the doctrines which fundamentally distinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. To each proposition I oppose either a widely different proposition or a direct negation; and I not only do it now, but have done it from the time when I became acquainted with his writings. This rejection of his cardinal principles should, I think, alone suffice; but there are sundry other views of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, which I equally reject"

And I have thereupon contrasted four other general views of Comte with the opposite views held by me.