Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 25.djvu/308

296 of his life, and to preserve intact his powers both of using these material things and getting further such. It is obvious to him that he can not do this if he acts alone. Against foreign invaders he is powerless unless he combines with his fellows; and the business of protecting himself against domestic invaders if he did not similarly combine, would be alike onerous, dangerous, and inefficient. That is to say, in respect of all measures for maintaining those conditions under which only the business of life can be carried on and its satisfactions obtained, every one will agree to co-operate; and, by implication, will agree to submit to the majority on all questions thence arising.

Details are not needful here; nor is it needful to discuss that border region lying between these classes of cases, and to say how much is included in the last and how much is excluded with the first. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to recognize the undeniable truth that there are numerous kinds of actions in respect of which men would not, if they were asked, agree with anything like unanimity to be bound by the will of the majority; while there are some kinds of actions in respect of which they would almost unanimously agree to be thus bound. Here, then, we find a definite warrant for enforcing the will of the majority within certain limits, and a definite warrant for denying the authority of its will beyond those limits.

But evidently, when analyzed, the question resolves itself into the further question. What are the relative claims of the aggregate and of its units? Are the rights of the community universally valid against the individual? or has the individual some rights which are valid against the community? The judgment given on this point underlies the entire fabric of political convictions formed, and more especially those convictions which concern the proper sphere of government. Here, then, I propose to revive a dormant controversy, with the expectation of reaching a different conclusion from that which is fashionable.

Says Professor Jevons, in his work, "The State in Relation to Labor"—"The first step must be to rid our minds of the idea that there are any such things in social matters as abstract rights." Of like character is the belief expressed by Mr. Matthew Arnold, in his article on copyright: "An author has no natural right to a property in his production. But then neither has he a natural right to anything whatever which he may produce or acquire." So, too, I recently read in a weekly journal of high repute, that "to explain once more that there is no such thing as 'natural right' would be a waste of philosophy." And the view expressed in these extracts is commonly uttered by statesmen and lawyers in a way implying that only the unthinking masses hold any other.