Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 25.djvu/116

108 C. Thirdly, come those who in all societies, at present, form far the greater part of the community—those, viz., who think chiefly of their own interests or their families', yet, though not specially careful to increase the happiness of others, are not selfishly intent on their own well-being only.

D. Fourthly, there are those who think solely of themselves, or, if they look beyond themselves, care only for their nearest kinsfolk, consciously disregarding the interests of others, and seeking only in the struggle for life the advancement of themselves or their families.

E. Lastly, there are those who, in their struggle to advance self, are prepared to prey on others if need be; in other words, willfully to do mischief to others for their own advantage.

In this classification we consider only the actual conduct of the various orders, not their expressed opinions. Were these to be taken into account, the classification would remain nominally unchanged, but the numbers belonging to the different classes would be very much

their happiness involves, if he is wise, a due regard for his own happiness and well-being also—and even primarily, because his existence and his fitness to do good necessarily came before the good he may be able to do.

One correspondent asks whether a man who could save life at his own peril ought not, according to the views I have indicated, to consider whether his life might not be of greater value to the community than the life which he could save by sacrificing or endangering his own. I may remark in passing that the man who most freely acknowledged, as a matter of pure reasoning, that in such a case he ought to weigh his own life's worth against the worth of that other life would probably be the first to risk his life for others; while the man who made cheap parade of his readiness to sacrifice his life would probably be the readiest to slink away at the moment of danger. We are not considering, however, what men should do under sudden impulse of danger affecting others—and especially the weak and tender. If we were, we might point out that in such cases there is much more at issue than the mere value of the lives at stake. If I saw a child, weak-minded, crippled, of small worth as a member of the body social, in danger from which I could save it at the risk or even the certainty of losing my own life (which I might judge of more value to the community), I trust that, whether I had to act on impulse or after reflection, I should act, not as weighing the value of that life against my own, but rather as considering what would be the evil influence of cowardice and meanness in a community. If I had time to reason, I might reason that, whatever value my life might have, must go but a small way to counterbalance the effect of evil example.

In many cases, however, men are bound first to think of the value of their life: they do so even in cases where eventually they know that their life must be sacrificed. The captain of an endangered ship, for instance, cares for his own life more than for the life of any on board, while his skill and experience are necessary to save life; and his actions in detail might under conceivable circumstances seem suggestive of mean care for his own life, when he knows at the very time that, after he has seen off the last boat—perhaps before many minutes are past—he and his best officers must go down with the ship.

It is singular and significant, however, that cavils such as I have here touched upon, come without a single exception in letters otherwise so worded as to show inexperience, deficiency of reasoning power, or that turn of mind, unfairly regarded as specially belonging to the weaker sex, which does not reason at all, but simply repeats parrot-like, and with constant reference to the last word, the maxims (often quite misunderstood) learned by rote in childhood