Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 16.djvu/782

748 The view of science upon this question is widely different. Of eternal fires, which serve at once to torture the skeptic and heighten the felicity of the saint, it knows nothing; the belief in them belongs rather to those cherished mysteries of faith which lie far beyond its scope. In that functional activity we call mind, it recognizes no power to originate uncaused volition. The universe is subject to law. Nothing ever happens or comes to pass without a cause. The cause determines the event, so that it could not be otherwise. What determines volition? Motives. The will is always determined by the strongest motive.

Given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, his actions might unerringly be inferred.—

The conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of Nature.—

The only meaning of the law of causation in the physical world is, that it generalizes universal experience of the order of that world; and, if experience shows a similar order to obtain among states of consciousness, the law of causation will properly express that order. That such an order exists is acknowledged by every sane man.—

It is claimed, however, that consciousness asserts itself with decisive force in favor of free-will. Is this true? "I dispute altogether," says Mill, "that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest desire or aversion." But this is a point which we are all able to investigate for ourselves. Indeed, the peculiar advantage of metaphysical study is the opportunity universally possessed of testing theory by observation, in watching the operations of our own minds. I propose, therefore, to go directly upon the ground assumed as their own by the advocates of free-will, and rest the proof of causation upon the uniform testimony of consciousness. It seems to me that the evidence in favor of the scientific view is so cumulative and convincing that a reasonable being, capable of comprehending the problem, and unbiased by dogma, could, after its consideration, more easily assert his intangibility than his liberty of volition.

If we define the will as that "by which the mind chooses anything," and an act of the will as an act of choosing or choice between two or more courses of conduct, or between action and inaction, it is evident that by far the greater portion of our acts occur without conscious exercise of this faculty. Walking along a muddy street, engaged in deep thought or earnest conversation with a friend, one picks his way, but consciously does not determine where at each step his foot is to be placed. We laugh when amused; weep from sympathy or grief; cry from pain; become agitated, irritable, excited, or angry, if sufficiently vexed, without previous choice whether or not we shall yield to these emotions. We speak of ourselves as acting "from the impulse of the moment," from habit, or "as we always do under such