Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 14.djvu/641

Rh of further logical "purification," it were ungenerous to press the objection too far. This creed is purer than that of Strauss: "We believe in no God, but only in a self-poised and, amid eternal changes, constant universum." It is wider than that of Hartmann: "God is a personification of force." It is simpler than that of Matthew Arnold: God is "a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." It is more intelligible than that of J. S. Mill: "A Being of great but limited power, how or by what limited we can not even conjecture"—a notion found also in Lucretius and in Seneca. It is more theological than that of Professor Huxley: "The order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties, and our volition counts for something in the course of events." It is similar to that of the ancient Brahmans: "That which can not be seen by the eye, but by which the eye sees, that is Brahma; if thou thinkest thou canst know it, then thou knowest it very little; it is reached only by him who says, 'It is! it is!' " And considering that this formula is very nearly what is said also by the Fathers of the Church, what better formula concordæ between science and theism could we require? For instance, Clemens Alexandrinus ( 200) echoes St. Paul's "Know Him, sayest thou! rather art known of him," with the confession, "We know not what he is, but only what he is not"; Cyril of Jerusalem ( 350) says, "To know God is beyond man's powers"; St. Augustine ( 400), "Rare is the mind that in speaking of God knows what it means"; John of Damascus ( 800), "What is the substance of God or how he exists in all things, we are Agnostics, and can not say a word"; and in the middle ages, Duns Scotus ( 1300): "Is God accessible to our reason? I hold that he is not."

It seems, then, there is a consensus among all competent persons, who have ever thought deeply on the subject, that the real nature of that Power which underlies all existing things is absolutely unknown to man. And it is allowable, therefore, in the last resort, to fall back upon Spinoza's word "sub-stance"; and to accept—if charity so require—as the common basis for theological reunion, the Agnostic formula, "Something Is."

But then, unless some means be found for instantly paralyzing the restless energy of human inquiry, the next question is inevitable: What is that Something? What are its qualities, its attributes?