Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/59

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their vein in all things by custom and use, bringing him that will give ear unto his words, to this pass, that he shall think vice to be virtue: working covertly and underhand for to deceive more cleanly, transforming virtue into vice, and making it nothing strange and coy to blame himself, for to do the more mischief afterwards to another: then he flattereth most when he maketh no semblance or shew at all that he mindeth any such thing, and exalteth up to the sky those that be most vicious and worst of all others, so they will give him entertainment. Likewise, for that flatterers shew themselves otherwhiles very forward and bold to speak their minds and to find fault, which is one of the best and surest marks of true friendship, he treateth consequently of this liberty and freedom of speech, and how a man may know whether there be any flattery therein or no. He declareth, therefore, how flatterers use this frank reprehension in vain and frivolous things, and never in those sins and gross faults which are indeed blameworthy: so that this manner of reprehension is a kind of soothing them up and lulling men asleep in their notorious vices: or else they charge them with faults clean contrary.

Now after he hath shewed how a man should take heed and beware of them, he discourseth of those services which may make flatterers, and wherein the same differ from the offices and duties of friends, and in pursuing and prosecuting this antithesis, he proveth that a flatterer is prest and ready to do us pleasure in shameful matters, whereas a friend sheweth his good will in those that be honest: also that a flatterer is envious, and so is not a friend. And for that our nature is proud and blind withal, having need of good friends to guide and direct it, he describeth with what manner of eye and ear we ought to see and hear those that procure our good, albeit they may seem to carry with them a kind of severity. Meanwhile he exhorteth friends so to temper and qualify their liberty in reprehension that all impudency and importunate rigour be far from it. But forasmuch as this is (as it were) the principal thing in amity, he sheweth that first we must cut away self-love in all our reprehensions; and secondly all injurious, bitter and biting speeches: then he adjoineth, moreover, in what seasons, and upon what occurrences, a man ought to reprove and say his mind frankly: and with what dexterity he is to proceed: that is to say, that sometimes, yea, and more often, he ought to rebuke his friend apart, or under the person of another: wherein he is to look unto this, that he eschew all vainglory, and season his reprehensions with some praise among, to make them more acceptable and better taken. Consequently, he teacheth us how we must receive the advertisements, admonitions, and reprehensions of a true friend: and returning to the very point, indeed, of amity and friendship, he sheweth what mean a man should keep for to avert and turn away the neighbour vice, and to urge our friends forward to their devoir: adding, moreover, that all remonstrance and admonition ought to be tempered with niildness and lenity: wherein he concludeth this whole treatise, which I assure you is to be well read and marked in these days of all persons, but those especially who are advanced above others in worldly wealth or honourable place.]