Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/37

Rh (by their saying) is there in the mind a dissension or sedition (as it were) of two divers faculties; but all the trouble that we feel is no more but an alteration or change of one and the self-same thing, to wit, reason both ways, which we ourselves are not able to perceive, for that forsooth it changeth suddenly and with such celerity: never considering all the while that the same faculty of the mind is framed by nature to concupiscence and repentance both: to be angry and to fear: inclined to commit some foul and dishonest fact, by the allurement of pleasure, and contrariwise restrained from the same for fear of pain. As for lust, fear, and all such-like passions, they are no other (say they) but perverse opinions and corrupt judgments not arising and engendered in any one part of the soul by itself, but spread over that which is the chief and principal, to wit, reason and understanding: whereof they be the inclinations, assensions, motions, and in one word, certain operations which in the turning of a hand be apt to change and pass from one to another: much like unto the sudden braids, starts and runnings to and fro of little children, which how violent soever they be and vehement, yet by reason of their weakness are but slippery, unsteadfast and unconstant.

But these assertions and oppositions of theirs are checked and refuted by apparent evidence and common sense: For what man is he that ever felt in himself a change of his lust and concupiscence into judgment: and contrariwise an alteration of his judgment into lust: neither doth the wanton lover cease to love when he doth reason with himself and conclude that such love is to be repressed, and that he ought to strive and fight against it: neither doth he then give over reasoning and judging, when being overcome through weakness, he yieldeth himself prisoner and thrall to lust: but like as when by advertisement of reason he doth resist in some sort a passion arising, yet the same doth still tempt him: so likewise, when he is conquered and overcome therewith, by the light of the same reason at that very instant, he seeth and knoweth that he sinneth and doth amiss: so that neither by those perturbations is reason lost and abolished; nor yet by reason is he freed and delivered from them; but whiles he is tossed thus to and fro he remaineth a neuter in the midst, or rather participating in common of them both.

As for those who are of opinion that one while the principal part of our soul is lust and concupiscence: and then anon that it doth resist and stand against the same: are much like unto them who imagine and say that the hunter and the wild beast