Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/367

 [ can it be defined whether of these two extremities is more to be feared, to wit, blockish stupidity or vain presumption, considering the dangerous effects proceeding as well from the one as the other. And contrariwise, an excellent matter it is to be able for to teach men the means to avoid both extremes, and to hold the mean between. And this is the very thing that our author doth in this present treatise: for as he laboureth to disrobe as it were the lovers of virtue and turn them out of their habit of perverse ignorance, wherewith most part of the world is always clad; so he is desirous to keep them from putting on the habiliment and garments of pride and vain ostentation, that they might be arrayed with the apparel of virtue, in such sort that in taking knowledge of that good whereof they have already some part, they might endeavour and do what they can to get a greater portion from day to day, until they come unto an assured contentment wherein they may rest. Then teacheth he how to know what a man hath profited in the school and exercise of virtue, shewing that he ought to consider first, whether he recoil from vice by little and little; wherein he confuteth the opinion of the Stoics, who imagined that no man was good unless he became virtuous all at once. This done, he adjoineth four rules to know the said profit and progress in virtue, to wit. When we perceive our heart to tend unto good without any intermission: When our affection redeemeth and regaineth the time that is lost, growing so much the more, as it was before stayed and hindered: When we begin to take our whole pleasure and delight therein: lastly, When we surmount and overcome all impeachments that might turn us aside out of the way of virtue. After all this, he entereth into the matter more specially, and showeth how a man is to employ himself in the study of wisdom; what vices he ought to fly; wherein his mind and spirits should be occupied; and the profit that he is to reap and gather from philosophers, poets, and historians. Item, with what affection we ought to speak in the presence of our neighbours, whether it be publicly or in private; of what sort our actions should be; and to what end and scope we are to address and direct them, giving a lustre unto all these discourses by excellent similitudes; taxing and reproving the faults committed ordinarily by them who make a certain semblance and outwEird shew of aspiring unto virtue. Having thus discoursed of