Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/326

 [ certain discourses going before, it appeareth what a benefit and good thing friendship is. And now Plutarch addeth thereto a certain correction very necessary in regard of our nature, which is given always to bend unto extremities, and not able long to hold the golden mean. Like as therefore it bewrayeth a miserable, wretched and cursed mind to be desirous for to lead a life without acquaintance and familiarity with any person; even so to make friends (as they say) hand over head and upon every occasion is peradventure impossible, but surely not expedient. Our author, therefore, willing to reform this disordinate affection that is in many, who because they would have a number of friends, oftentimes have not one assured, sheweth that it is far better for a man to get one fast and faithful friend than a great multitude of whom he cannot make any certain account; propounding as a remedy for this covetous mind of entertaining such a plurality of friends, the examples of those who are contented with few, and by that means think their estate more sure and steadfast. After this, he treateth of the choice of friends, but especially of one. Then discourseth he of that which is requisite in true friendship, annexing thereto many proper and apt similitudes, which represent as well the benefit that sincere affection bringeth, as the hurt which cometh of feigned and counterfeit amity. This done, he proveth that to entertain a number of friends is a very hard matter, yea, and impossible; for that a man is not able to converse with them, nor to frame and sort with them all, but that he shall procure himself enemies on all sides: and when he hath enriched and adorned the same with notable examples, he proceedeth to describe what use a man is to make of friendship, and with what sort and condition of men he ought to join in amity: but this is the conclusion; That an honest and virtuous man cannot quit himself well and perform his devoir unto many friends at once.] upon a time demanded of Menon the Thessalian, who was esteemed very sufficient in all literature, and a great schoolman, exercised in long practice of disputations, and named to be one (as Empedocles saith) who had attained to the very height and perfection of wisdom and learning, what virtue was; and when he had answered readily and boldly enough in this wise: There is a virtue (quoth he) of a young child, and of an old gray-beard; of a man, and of a woman; of a magistrate, and of a