Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/32

10 But now, forasmuch as this term of mean or mediocrity may be understood diverse ways, we are to set down what kind of mean this moral virtue is. First and foremost, therefore, whereas there is one mean compounded of two simple extremes, as a russet or brown colour between white and black: also that which containeth and is contained must needs be the middest between the thing that doth contain and is contained, as for example, the number of 8 is just between 12 and 4, like as that which taketh no part at all of either extreme, as namely, those things which we call adiaphora, indifferent, and do partake neither good nor ill: In none of these significations or senses can this virtue be called a mean or mediocrity. For surely it may not be in any wise a composition or mixture of two vices which be both worse: neither doth it comprehend the less and defective: or is comprehended of that which is overmuch above decency and excessive, nor yet is it altogether void of passions and perturbations, subject to excess and defect, to more and less than is meet. But this moral virtue of ours, as it is indeed, so also it is called a mean, especially in respect of that mediocrity which is observed in the harmony and accord of sounds. For like as in music there is a note or sound called the mean, for that it is the middes between the base and treble, which in Greek be called hypate and nete, and lieth just betwixt the height and loudness of the one and the lowness or baseness of the other: Even so, moral virtue being a motion and faculty about the unreasonable part of the soul, tempereth the remission and intention, and in one word, taketh away the excess and defect of the passions, reducing each of them to a certain mediocrity and moderation that falleth not on any side.

Now, to begin with fortitude, they say it is the mean between cowardice and rash audacity, of which twain the one is a defect, the other an excess of the ireful passion. Liberality, between niggardise and prodigality; clemency and mildness, between senseless indolence and cruelty; justice, the mean of giving more or less than due, in contracts and affairs between men: like as temperance, a mediocrity between the blockish stupidity of the mind moved with no touch of pleasure, and an unbridled looseness whereby it is abandoned to all sensuality.

Wherein especially and most clearly is given us to understand and see the difference between the brutish and the reasonable part of the soul: and thereby evident it is that wandering passions be one thing and reason another: for otherwise we should not discern continency from temperance, nor