Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/30

8 a virtue; in case the same be well ordered and directed thereby. Moreover, forasmuch as philosophers do not hold and affirm, that every virtue is a mediocrity nor call it moral: to the end, therefore, that we may the better declare and shew the difference, we had need to fetch the beginning of this discourse farther off.

Of all things then that be in the world, some have their essence and being of themselves absolutely and simply; others respectively and in relation to us. Absolutely have their being the earth, the heaven, the stars, and the sea; respectively and in regard of us, good, evil, profitable, hurtful, pleasant, and displeasant. Now, it being so, that reason doth contemplate and behold the one sort as well as the other: the former rank of those things which are simply and absolutely so, pertain unto science and speculation, as their proper objects; the second kind of those things which are understood by reference and regard unto us, pertain properly unto consultation and action. And as the virtue of, the former sort is called sapience: so the virtue of the other is named prudence. For a difference there is between prudence and sapience: in this, that prudence consisteth in a certain relation and application of the contemplative faculty of the soul unto action, and unto the regiment of the sensual part according to reason: by which occasion prudence had need of the assistance of fortune: whereas sapience hath nothing to do with it, no more than it hath need of consultation, for to attain and reach unto the end it aimeth at. For that indeed it concerneth such things as be ever one and always of the same sort.

And like as the geometrician never consulteth as touching a triangle, to wit, whether it hath three angles equal to twain that be right or no? because he knoweth assuredly that it hath (for all consultations are concerning things that vary and alter sometime after one sort, and otherwhiles after another, and never meddleth with those that be firm, stable, and immutable), even so, the understanding and contemplative faculty of the mind, exercising her functions in those first and principal things which be permanent, and have evermore the same nature, not capable of change or mutation, is sequestered and exempt altogether from consultation. But prudence, which descendeth to things full of variety, error, trouble, and confusion, must of necessity eftsoons intermeddle with casualties, and use deliberation in things more doubtful and uncertain: yea, and after it hath consulted to proceed unto action, calling and drawing unto it the reasonless part also to be assistant and present, as drawn into the judgment of things to be executed. For need those