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Socrates is surely-not too old to learn a little common-sense. Philosophy, as a part of education, is a good thing, no doubt, to start with. But if a man carries it with him into later life, he becomes a useless and ridiculous member of society, at the mercy of any chance accuser; hiding in holes and corners, and whispering to a few chosen youths, instead of standing forth boldly before the world, and making his mark in life.

Socrates compliments Callicles on a frankness so rarely met with, but presses him as to the exact sense of natural justice"—i.e., the will of the stronger. By "stronger" Callicles explains that he means the wise and stout-hearted politician, who has the ambition and spirit and desires of a king; and who, moreover, will not scruple to gratify them to the full. "Yes," says Callicles, emphatically, "luxury, intemperance, and licence, if they are duly supported, are happiness and virtue—all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to nature, and nothing worth."

Socrates, in his own fashion, disproves these monstrous doctrines, and forces Callicles, though much against his will, to admit that pleasure and virtue are not always identical; that really Virtue is, or should be, the end of all our actions; that in the long-run the just and temperate man alone is happy; and that he who leads a robber's life is abhorred by gods and men while upon earth, and goes down to Hades with his soul branded with the sears of his crimes. There must