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 the good old Athenian gentlemen, and the statesmen of a past age."

But this Socrates will not allow. These great statesmen never imparted their own wisdom to their sons, and yet they surely would have done so had it been possible.

Anytus is indignant that his heroes should be so lightly spoken of, and angrily bids Socrates be careful of his words, and remember that it is easier to do men harm in Athens than to do them good.

Still the original question has not been answered, "Is Virtue teachable?" and Socrates inclines to think it "a gift from heaven," and that it may be directed by another faculty, practically as useful as knowledge, namely, "right opinion;" and this is a sort of divine instinct possessed by statesmen, but which they cannot impart to others. The higher form of virtue—the ideal knowlegeknowledge [sic]—is possessed by none; and if a man could be found both possessing it and able to impart it, he would be like Tiresias, as Ulysses saw him in Hades, who alone had understanding in the midst of a world of shadows.

This Dialogue carries us back to the days when the trial of Socrates was still impending. One morning the philosopher meets the augur Euthyphro at the entrance of the law-courts.

"What are you doing here?" asks the augur. "I am defendant," Socrates answers, "in a suit which a