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661 is said to have been elevating, when it was a substitute for extermination" (p. 251). Professor Muirhead is also careful to differentiate the forms of theism as regards their moral influence. These exceptions, I am aware, may seem to outnumber the cases which fall under the rule as at first stated. But, in spite of all such criticisms, coöperation rather than antagonism is set forth as the principle of the ethical movement. It is hospitable toward men of all shades of opinion, provided only they are agreed in seeking to promote right living. It is recognized that theists and atheists, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews may all unite in furthering the interests of practical morality.

Another principle on which there is general agreement is that the ethical societies should make it their task to teach morality rather than theories of morality. Sir John Seeley urges that the true method is to "ascend from practical needs" to the problems of abstract science, rather than to "descend from theory to practice." In a similar spirit, Professor Sidgwick recommends that, instead of seeking for ultimate principles, they "remain, as far as possible, in the region of 'middle axioms.'" Mr. Bosanquet also insists upon the endeavor to communicate "moral ideas" and not "ideas about morality," as the true aim of such organizations. Mr. Stephen presents the same distinction as that between "the abstract theory and the art of conduct." "You no more teach men to be moral by giving them a sound ethical theory, than you teach them to be good shots by explaining the theory of projectiles" (p. 282). The academic teacher of ethics often has occasion to wish that this principle were better understood. He undertakes his task primarily to satisfy an intellectual demand, not to improve practical morals. He is fortunate if, in the prosecution of his work, he is not frequently made to feel the force of George Eliot's saying to the effect that, after long study of ethics, men succeed in conducting themselves almost as well as before. While not in any wise denying the distinction stated above, Professor Muirhead ably argues for a somewhat wider interpretation of the functions of an ethical society, to include a discussion of some fundamental principles. For, in the first place, such discussion, he says, "whether we like it or not, is in the air," occupying an important place in all the literature of our time. And, in the second place, many of those who seek the aid of the ethical society are looking for intellectual help. "It is their reason that has been outraged, and it is their reason, in the first instance, that must be satisfied" (p. 323).

Still another principle which may be said to be recognized, implicitly or explicitly by all, is that the sanctions for the good life are