Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/579

563 what it has to tell us about the ultimate nature of the universe. In this inquiry he makes a sharp distinction between science and philosophy. Science deals merely with the sequences of events, and has nothing to do with ultimate questions such as Freedom, Teleology, the existence of God. All these fall outside of its province, and its results stand unaltered whatever metaphysical position be adopted. Evolution, therefore, being a scientific hypothesis, does not settle any metaphysical problem.

The author's own answer to these ultimate questions does not seem to be quite consistent. In the first part of the book he deduces the existence of God from the existence of moral ideals. In the latter part of the work he establishes the truth of religion on the will-to-believe principle. Science, he tells us, depends upon the hypothesis of the uniformity of nature. This hypothesis cannot be proved, hence science rests ultimately upon faith. Similarly we must accept the axioms of reason without proof. Morality is in the same position as science and logic. We believe in the principles of morality, "not because we can prove them, but because we wish to believe, and because we have faith in the right." For the religious belief in God there is the same lack of evidence, but also the same justification.—The fallacy in this method of reasoning seems fairly obvious. The author shows that certain things cannot be demonstrated, and this every one would admit. He then proceeds to assert that we accept them on faith, that is, because we wish to accept them. This assertion is not logically necessary nor true in point of fact. We 'accept' the principles of reason, for instance, not because we wish to do so, but simply because as rational beings we must reason more or less, and when we reason we must proceed according to the laws of our reason. Such indemonstrable principles we 'accept' because we must. The presence of these principles therefore affords no justification for adopting any point of view merely because it harmonizes with our wishes.

As a whole, however, the book makes a very favorable impression on the reader. The critical discussions are excellent and probably constitute the chief value of the work. The author is inclined to repeat himself, but he states his case well, and the book abounds in telling phrases and apt illustrations.

This book is a study of the strictly philosophical part of Comte's doctrine. Accordingly, it deals exclusively with the first stage of Comte's development, and leaves out of account the succeeding stage in which his philosophy was transformed into a religion. This does not mean that the author regards the two stages as inconsistent with one another. On the contrary, he contends that they were originally related. Comte's contribution to philosophy proper, however, is the most original and historically the