Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/568

552 discovery and exposition of scientific results, with the character of those results. Science is indeed a system of verifiable facts logically arranged and classified, and discovered by certain methods, but it is also something more; namely the discovery how complex processes are but the exemplification of the natural interaction of elementary structures not further reducible, and it is this something more that distinguishes it as science. Exception ought also to be taken to Professor Hoffman's conception of philosophy as the unification of the sciences, for philosophy does something else than unify science. While like science it deals with reality, and thus may be said to have the same subject matter as science, its purpose is different. It does not, like science, seek to resolve complex processes or their sum into previously known or supposed simple elements and their activities, it seeks rather to formulate a conception of reality itself. It asks not how is the universe in all its complexity to be explained, but what in all its complexity is it. Thus while it is true, as Professor Hoffman asserts, that "every department of knowledge is capable of scientific treatment," such treatment does not exhaust reality. Reality itself is more than any scientific explanation can reveal, and it is this 'more' which philosophy tries to make evident and appreciable. Every great system of philosophy is evidence of this, and this is the mark of the idealistic philosophies in particular; for their great merit is just the insistence that the completest scientific explanation can never be made a substitute for reality, or for a philosophy of reality.

Professor Hoffman gives the following as the presuppositions of science in the chapter entitled "What Science Takes for Granted": (1) the scientist's knowledge of his own existence, so that he can separate himself from his sensations and contemplate them in order to form general notions; (2) a similar knowledge of self he must allow to all his fellows in order to insure communication; (3) the existence and validity of the laws of thought; (4) the rational construction of the universe, which involves (a) that all objects of science are related as substance and attribute, (b) that every beginning or change of existence in the universe has a cause, (c) that the universe exists in space and time, (d) that the universe is regulated and controlled by design, (e) that the universe is constructed so as to be consistent with itself; (5) that the human mind is, in some respects at least, a reflex of the divine; and finally, (6) that the realm of science is coincident with the realm of reflective thought. This seems much like saying that science takes for granted the whole of the Cartesian philosophy. While scientific investigations may involve some of these presuppositions when epistemologically considered, it can hardly be claimed that the success of science depends on even their tacit presupposition, and least of all that the authority of science rests on such a set of ulterior truths (p. 39).

The certainty possible for science is expressed as follows: "The conclusion of the whole matter is this, that it is never necessary, in fact that it is never possible, to do more for any doctrine, in any department of inquiry,