Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/562

546 correct, for thereby it would form a link in the obligatory. The attempt to make every action a moral concern is but a hollow and flattering tribute to the idol of duty.

The author here treats his subject in a popular style, and from a practical point of view. Except in ages of faith there is in most men's lives a region of doubt and indecision. The good man of two generations ago was an individualist (one who thinks mainly of personal obligations). The point of view has now shifted, and social obligation and not personal virtues and duties occupy the thoughts of the good man of the present day. The imperial problem has compelled us to face the new question of our obligations to the progress of civilization throughout the world. International ethics is still in the individualistic stage; the 'honor' of a nation is but the honor of a gentleman in the old duelling days. Thus practical problems of the day force upon us the question of the source of moral obligation. I. The authority of the state has been regarded as this source, both by primitive peoples and to some extent even at the present time. This does not touch many aspects of the life of the modern man, nor is it adequate when we think of the obligations of the state towards subject races or towards other sovereign powers. II. Among early peoples the will of the divine power or powers was the source of moral obligation. To-day this is unsatisfactory, for modern thought tends to proceed from the idea of morality to the idea of God, rather than from the idea of God to the idea of morality. III. Conscience, which was long regarded as the voice of God, is connected closely with the preceding as a source. Conscience however needs education, and thus we are led to: IV. Reason. Farther than this we cannot go. As reasonable beings we cannot but be convinced that whatever actions are reasonable are right. This source of moral obligation is a somewhat dry one, and, in spite of Kant's efforts to prove the contrary, cannot of itself furnish us with any real content for the moral life. All that reason can do is to point us to some end at which it is reasonable to aim. The thought of that end becomes the ultimate source of moral obligation. We can only get to understand that end by studying human nature in the concrete in relation to the conditions under which it has to develop. The great lesson of modern thought is that our whole life is a development, that it is only through its growth that we can learn by degrees what its meaning is; and that its claim upon our devotion lies simply in its being the only way in which we can realize what we truly are. Only by living can we grow in understanding of the duties of life.