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226 and Theodicy, of the relation of morality to religion, and of the freedom of the will. The philosophical reader will probably feel here that things are moving a little too rapidly, and may find it necessary to recall the author's own disclaimers and the dominance of the practical interest in his mind. Of the discussion of the practical questions of conduct in Book III, I think every reader will subscribe to Professor Thilly's estimate: "The healthy common sense pervading the entire work and its freedom from exaggerations cannot but win the admiration of the reader." The value of these discussions for students of ethics, as well as for the general reader, must be fully recognized. As the translator says: "Many of our ethical treatises have a tendency to repel the average intelligent reader and to deaden instead of quicken his thoughts; they make him feel that the subjects under discussion have absolutely no connection with life, at least, not with his life; they often speak to him of things about which he knows nothing and cares less, in language which he cannot understand." So engrossing is the interest of this third Book that the English reader will experience a feeling of keen disappointment that Book IV, containing "an outline of the theory of the State and of Society," is not included in the present translation. Let us hope that Professor Thilly will yet add to our obligations by adding this book, which, if published as a separate little volume, would prove a most serviceable text-book for students of social and political philosophy.

One cannot leave the work without recognizing the value of the first Book, in which Professor Paulsen traces with masterly skill the historical development of moral conceptions from Greek to modern times. Such an historical investigation of morality the author, like Wundt and other moralists who have been influenced by the idea of evolution, regards as the indispensable basis of ethical science. The most important part of this Book is undoubtedly the account of the Christian conception of life, and of the changing fortunes of this conception in the early Christian centuries and in the Middle Ages.

J. S.

This work is, we are told, an essay in "pure, theoretical, metaphysical philosophy," guided by a single passion—"curiosity about the ultimate secrets, the need of piercing the veil, and getting a clear view of the mysteries of the grand total of things" (p. 6). All previous efforts in philosophy have failed, and so M. Ribert, in traditional French fashion, would begin by washing the slate clean, making table rase, and then starting afresh. Before entering on his task, however, our author feels that he must resolve the doubt, to which those previous failures of philosophy give rise, of the capacity of reason to know ultimate truth. The ways out of agnosticism which are here suggested, are certainly far too easy to satisfy the