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187 they really constitute but one principle is borne out by the statement that merely for purposes of treatment has he abstractly viewed them as separate, since "there can no comparison be made without considering the things compared as distinct and different." On account of this methodological dualism, however, one should not, in view of such a caution, which is elsewhere repeated, be led to think that Butler regarded the two principles as distinct faculties or mutually exclusive principles of action. They are simply different aspects of reason, which lead to different aspects of the common end of man.

Like self-love, benevolence imposes its own obligation, but it also, equally with action from self-love, receives a higher sanction, since our moral faculty approves of benevolent conduct, and disapproves of the contrary, as such, and considered independently of consequences. Thus rational benevolence too becomes a 'virtuous principle' associated with conscience; or, in other words, it also is to be viewed as an aspect of the moral faculty, and benevolence, like prudence, becomes a strictly moral duty and a province of the domain of virtue.