Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/197

181 character. In the absence of a definite standard, the justness of the comparative relation "can be judged of only from our nature and condition in this world." Nevertheless, although varying with circumstances, "the proportion is real." It, however, can hardly be one of equality, since we can never actually feel the interests of others in the same literal sense in which we are conscious of our own. Moral obligations also, which cannot extend further than natural possibilities, should teach us, Butler thinks, to have an especial care of our own interests and conduct, because we are particularly responsible for ourselves.

After describing the happy influence which benevolence exercises upon all the different relations and circumstances of human life, Butler raises the question: In what sense is benevolence inclusive of all virtue? The primary condition to be noted is that "when benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a principle in reasonable creatures." Now, reason leads us to consider distant as well as immediate consequences, and teaches us also that some persons have a greater claim than others upon our benevolence. Thus, "reason, considered merely as subservient to benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good," may be said to correct the abstractness of its own law of universal and democratic benevolence, and, by having a regard for the natural relations and affinities of life, to furnish a non-quantitative principle of distribution, by which we can best serve the common good of all. Wherein exactly this common welfare consists, and what specific acts contribute thereunto, must be determined by experience, by an appeal to the "laws and the judgment of mankind." No more than in the case of self-interest does reason possess intuitive knowledge of the content of the general happiness.

Having pointed out the rational character of benevolence as a moral principle, Butler returns to his query, and his first step is to insist upon the value of happiness to all mankind: "It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature but happiness." This sentence has frequently been