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179 happiness as a normal governing principle, parallel to the calm regard for private happiness, which he calls self-love," admits that "the language of the first sermon rather suggests that there are three regulative principles"; but he thinks that "on looking closer at Butler's language it will be seen that what he contemplates under the notion of benevolence is not definitely a desire for general good as such, but rather kind affection for particular individuals," since Butler describes it in the following way: "If there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion, as the parental or filial affections; if there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another; this is itself benevolence."

The stricture might, indeed, be thus justified, were it not for the fact that Butler's whole account of the function of particular other-regarding affections shows that he did necessarily distinguish between specific kind affections and the regulative principle of benevolence. The two presuppose each other and are explicable only through each other. As rational benevolence is necessary to control the particular social affections, so, on the other hand, the latter are indispensable aids to render the former efficient and practical. We cannot trust to reason alone to enforce either duties to self or duties to others: "It is manifest our life would be neglected, were it not for the calls of hunger, and thirst, and weariness; notwithstanding that without them reason would assure us, that the recruits of food and sleep are the necessary means of our preservation. It is therefore absurd to imagine, that, without affection, the same reason alone would be more effectual to engage us to perform the duties we owe to our fellow creatures." Stoic apathy results from moral distemper, just as want of the appetite of hunger is caused by bodily disease. A social affection like compassion is an advocate within us, arguing in behalf of our fellows, and procuring consideration for their case at the bar of reason. Such a description of the relation of particular social affections and the general reasonable principle of