Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/194

178. That analysis shows only the 'unnatural' character of Hobbes's state of warfare, taking nature in the same sense in which Hobbes spoke of it. But, however much we deny the applicability of the terms 'interested' and 'disinterested' to particular affections, disinterested conduct is not to be finally explained by the objective reference of particular social affections. And, although Butler does not rest in this solution, he does not seem to appreciate the significance of his own double treatment, in that he fails to distinguish exactly what problems he solves by regarding benevolence on the two levels. It cannot be claimed that the treatment of benevolence as a particular affection shows in any real sense the coincidence of interested and disinterested action, because as such, the appetite of hunger on Butler's analysis is equally disinterested. This coincidence can be shown only through the conception of a social self, in which the two distinguishable but not separable sides of conduct become the expression of one principle, which may be called social-self-love, or love of the social self. The treatment of benevolence as a principle coördinate with self-love must now be considered, in order to ascertain how far Butler recognized this more adequate conception.

The whole argument of the first sermon implies that there are three regulative principles, self-love, benevolence, and conscience; and that the two former are coördinate with each other, but both subordinate to conscience. To prove that man is made both for a personal and a common end, Butler points to the "indications in human nature" which plainly show that we were made for both. These indications are threefold: "First, there is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual"; secondly, "the several passions and affections, which are distinct both from benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute to and lead us to public good as really as to private"; thirdly, conscience tends equally to both ends. Here, in a general survey of human nature, Butler clearly places benevolence on a level with self-love, and distinguishes it from the particular affections. Professor Sidgwick, while maintaining that Butler "does not distinctly recognize a calm regard for