Page:Philosophical Review Volume 9.djvu/191

175 without the proper restraints. If it be asked whether we are to submit then only to those restraints which bring upon the whole 'more satisfaction than uneasiness,' Butler assents. To this he can logically agree, because he insists that it is virtuous, and not vicious, conduct which promotes happiness, and that, therefore, a man who subjects himself only to such restraints as tend ultimately to his own interest, would be acting in conformity with virtue. Conscience and true self-love "lead us to one and the same course of life."

It is in this connection that Butler allows himself to make a statement which seems to assign to self-love a regulative equality with conscience: "Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man; because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated; but becomes unsuitable if either of those are." This statement, however, ought not to be regarded as intended either to mean that self-love and conscience are two coordinate regulative principles, or to exclude benevolence as a regulative principle. The problem resulted from a comparison merely of conscience and self-love with the particular affections, both individual and social, and the whole argument goes to show that this exaltation of self-love means nothing more than that rational self-love partakes of the nature of virtue ; that "conscience and self-love: if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way."

In the first sermon on "Love of our Neighbour," Butler takes the same ground, and throughout treats benevolence as a particular affection, and consequently as subservient to self-love. His thesis is that "there is no peculiar rivalship or competition between self-love and benevolence." There are cases in which private interest