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This book raises the question of man's moral relation to the lower animals. The author's contention is that, if we fully realize all that the doctrine of evolution implies, we must recognize that animals have rights which we are morally bound to respect. He finds that "in tracing the history of the evolution of ethics the recognition of mutual rights and duties is confined at first to members of the same horde or tribe, is then extended to worshippers of the same gods, and gradually enlarged so as to include all races of men." At the present time all forms of organic life, however inferior to man, are being slowly brought within the sphere of mutual rights and duties. The process throughout has been slow, owing to the false notions engendered by "man's false and overweening conceit of himself as the member of a tribe, the inhabitant of a planet, or the lord of creation." At the present time, despite the doctrine of evolution, this primitive conceit still remains in the form of anthropocentric prejudice and prepossessions, and Mr. Evans therefore devotes most of his energy to the marshalling of facts against this last stronghold of the enemy. He brings forward a great array of evidence to prove that animals do act with a consciousness of the end to be attained, can adapt themselves to circumstances, have moral qualities, and are capable of intellectual and moral progress. It is shown also that they have social institutions, and that these are subject to a process of development. Highly developed animal communities, such as those which are formed by certain species of ants, present many features curiously analogous to those of human societies. Moreover, according to Mr. Evans, there is evidence to prove that animals have general ideas, can communicate with one another, have æsthetic taste, and even the elements of the religious sense. In short there is no barrier between man and beast, and "the more exact and extended our knowledge of animal intelligence becomes, the more remarkable does its resemblance to human intelligence appear." The book as a whole is an interesting, if rather popular and discursive, treatment of one of the applications of the theory of evolution.

This monograph is a brief study of the relation between Fichte and Kant, with special reference to the problem of the thing-in-itself. After a short sketch of the contributions of Reinhold, Schulze, Maimon, and Beck, to the doctrine of the Ding-an-sich, the author turns to the consideration of his special problem. The following are his chief conclusions: The Non-Ego differs from Kant's thing-in-itself in that it is "merely something for the Ego." Moreover, from the point of view of the 'practical'