Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/156

140 severity. Sudden or almost instinctive anger is useful for self-defence and individual preservation. Each is subject to its own peculiar forms of abuse and perversion, resulting, on the hand, in such vices as unreasonable resentment, malice, revenge, and on the other in that which is commonly called 'passion,' rage, and fury, "to which some men are liable in the same way as others are to the epilepsy," and peevishness, "which languidly discharges itself upon everything which comes in its way."

In this way, by elaborate psychological analysis, Butler establishes his denial of the existence of inward principles which in themselves lead to evil. It was necessary for him to enter into the discussion somewhat in detail, since the difficulty was peculiarly important for him, and the validity of the teleological argument was in large measure at stake. If it had been found true that within human nature there were contradictory principles leading to opposing ends, then either it would have been illogical to deduce virtue as the end from the structure of our being, or our nature could not be regarded as constituted by organically connected parts. Taking both sorts of principles as existent, one could argue from design either to vice or to virtue as the natural end, or one could deny altogether the validity of such deduction since it landed in contradiction concerning the very point it was invoked to establish. On the other hand, if Butler had taken refuge in the fact that principles of evil could not meet with the sanction of reason, and, therefore, should not be allowed influence in moral conduct, his central doctrine of human nature as an organic whole would have failed. To debar any natural principles whatever from some function in the realization of the self, would be equal to the position that there are parts of our nature which do not properly belong to it. This would mean that there is no real organic whole, and that the prescribed end is the end only of the highest part, and not one toward the realization of which our whole nature in all its parts can harmoniously cooperate. Although it is required that all action should be in accordance with right