Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/153

137 two principles are different, still they coincide perfectly, since they are mutually dependent on each other, in a nature like ours, for the attainment of their respective ends. And this very coincidence furnishes further proof that we were made for both ends.

Employing once more the teleological argument, Butler's next step is to show that the several particular passions and affections, distinct both from benevolence and self-love, point to the same conclusion, since they "in general contribute and lead us to public good as really as to private." As an example of the latter, Butler cites hunger, "because the end for which it was given us is the preservation of the individual." An instance of the former sort is desire of esteem, "because the end for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards society." The object and end of the former is merely food; the object and end of the latter is merely esteem: but the latter can no more be gratified without contributing to the good of society, than the former can be gratified without contributing to the preservation of the individual." Even if desire of esteem and similar passions, like indignation against successful vice, which Butler views as public affections or passions, "be considered likewise as private affections tending to private good, this does not hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good influence of them upon society and their tendency to public good." 4 Thus there is in the case of these particular affections, which are distinct from self-love and benevolence, as great a coincidence in result as was found in the general principles. Even if men act from regard, e.g., of reputation, without any consideration of the good of others, they nevertheless contribute to the social good, as much as they contribute to the preservation of the individual, if they act merely from the appetite of hunger, without any rational conviction of the desirableness of life. So by acting almost blindly according to impulse, we may be led to carry out our Maker's design, although the only sure and moral way of so doing, the only way consonant with our nature as a whole, is to bring all our conduct before the supreme principle of our