Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/150

134 essentially the same. Assuming that from the inward frame of man and its natural adaptations we can ascertain what course of life and behavior that real nature points out and leads to, Butler argues from the fact of the existence and nature of conscience to the proper end of our being. He finds that, as the moral faculty, it is designed for and hence adapted to virtue. Since it is not only the supreme part, but also the synthetic principle of the human organism, its goal becomes identical with the complete end of man, or, in other words, obedience to conscience secures the realization of man's whole nature. Therefore, for Butler, morality consists in acting in accordance with the whole of human nature, and his maxim becomes "Follow human nature as a whole." We saw above that for Kant, morality meant action in accordance with the highest principle of man's nature. Butler, too, might have expressed his conclusion in the same way, for he sees that, on his view, the two statements really mean the same thing. In speaking of the ancients, he says that "though it should be thought that they meant no more than that vice was contrary to the higher and better part of our nature; even this implies such a constitution as I have endeavoured to explain. For the very terms higher and better imply a relation or respect of parts to each other; and these relative parts, being in one and the same nature, form a constitution, and are the very idea of it." Although to make virtue consist in following the highest principles in man is, therefore, no "loose and inderminate" way of speaking, "but clear and distinct, strictly just and true," as the various principles in man are "totally different, not in degree, but in kind," nevertheless Butler rightly prefers his own expression, since, however different, these principles all belong to one constitution and their relation is conceived as organic. Kant might have said the same thing, if it were not for the fact that, apparently at any rate, he does not conceive the relation between the rational and the sensible self to be organic; consequently he cannot admit the end of the sentient self into his