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552 cause of the greater clearness with which 'Rationalism' marks the tendency of the various ethical movements which are here grouped together. With Professor Seth's final construction of the moral ideal as an ideal of 'personality,' a full and complete realization of all the powers of the self, including both 'sensibility' and 'reason,' I find myself in almost complete agreement. But occasionally his method seems to have carried him farther in his criticism of 'the ethics of sensibility' than this final construction demands. There is, I think, a psychological defect in the treatment of 'sensibility,' viz.: the more or less conscious limitation of 'sensibility' to its lower forms, and a consequent confusion of it with physical 'impulse,' 'instinct,' natural 'tendencies,' and 'desires.' (See, e.g., pp. 189-203.) The dualism of 'flesh' and 'spirit' is thus wrongly identified with that of 'sensibility' and 'reason.' The dualism upon which Professor Seth insists is a very real one, and it is not stated a whit too strongly. But it seems unfortunate that in its exposition 'sensibility' should have been so closely identified with the 'sensuous' feelings, and not given its full psychological meaning. 'Sensibility' is only one element in the states designated as 'impulse,' 'instinct,' etc. The conative element is often quite as prominent as the affective. And 'sensibility' is surely as much a matter of the 'spirit' as of the 'flesh.' If hedonism as 'the ethics of sensibility' be interpreted in accordance with this narrower use of 'sensibility,' it can, indeed, have little to say for itself. This is, however, a matter of terminology, and in one place, at least, Professor Seth almost suggests the desirability of a change by his use of 'immediate' and 'natural' (p. 201) to qualify 'sensibility.' Apart from this question of terminology, the chapter stands as a splendid vindication of 'reason' as not only the regulative but also the constitutive principle of the good life. The new chapter on 'Moral Progress' in Part II fits well the general plan of the work, and preserves its unity of thought. The moral ideal, it is said, must "explain the history of evolving moral life, the process of moral experience as a whole" (p. 317). Conversely, the fact that a principle yields an intelligible interpretation of the course of moral history will be an important 'verification' of that principle. The law of moral progress is defined as "the progressive discovery of the individual" (p. 323). As regards the aspects of this law in detail, it is shown to be (a) a "transition from an external to an internal view," (b) a "subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues," and (c) an extension of the "scope of virtue." The discussion will be found an excellent antidote to the prevailing tendency to lose the individual personality in the social body.

The result of this revision and enlargement is an altogether admirable work, which is destined to fill a still larger place than heretofore as a college text-book. Its very freedom from the stereotyped text-book form will commend it to many instructors, especially to those who desire to make their own lectures the basis of instruction, but still deem it advisable that the student should have in his hands some book for careful and systematic