Page:Philosophical Review Volume 7.djvu/413

399 sociological rather than a psychological one. Its worth is in throwing light upon the particular type of social organization or institution which is under discussion. In any event the two sorts of problems, that concerning process and that concerning content, are quite distinct, and the failure to put clearly to one's self which problem it is he is endeavoring to solve, can result only in confusion. Mr. Baldwin seems to me to take the latter point of view when he says that his thesis "falls into two main inquiries: What are the principles which the individual shows in his mental life … and what additional principles, if any, does society exhibit?" (p. 1). This seems also to be what he has in mind when he speaks of the "psychological development of the individual examined for light upon the social elements and movements of his nature" (p. 2). The latter phrase, however, seems to contain just the ambiguity in mind. So far as one is simply looking for social elements in the individual, I do not see any particular sense in the qualifying phrase 'psychological.'

The bearing of the distinction may be seen from the following considerations. From the standpoint of content as the final criterion, we should be obliged to say that the social nature of the individual ceased as soon as the elements in his experience ceased to be identical with those of his fellows. The common elements would define his sociality; the unlike elements, his individuality. But from the standpoint of process all this would be a matter of relative indifference; it is conceivable that the whole process simply as such is individual, while in its raison d'être, genesis, and outcome it is social. Moreover, if we take the standpoint of content, the question arises: What is the import of the consciousness of personality, and how does the sense of personality differentiate into consciousness of self on one side and of others on the other? The mere presence of identical and unlike elements is quite a different thing from the sense of community, and from the sense of individual selfhood as attributed to one's self or to others. This is clearly recognized when Mr. Baldwin says that the question is: "What is in consciousness when one thinks of himself or of another person?" And again: "To get such inquiries down to a psychological basis the first requisite to be reached is the concept of the person. Not the person as we look at him in action, alone, or chiefly; but the person as he thinks of himself" (p. 13). I do not see that this inquiry has anything to do with the matter of common content as between different individuals. It is simply a question of discovering the conditions which determine the sense of personality. The criterion for the social or non-social character of the latter will consist in the