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HE question at issue between Optimism and Pessimism is fundamental for ethical philosophy, and might fittingly serve as the point of departure for the development of an ethical theory. Manifestly the answer which is given to the question, Is life worth living? will determine the goal of moral striving. A negative answer necessarily involves the judgment that conduct should have, as its ultimate aim, the decrease, and even the destruction, of life; while a positive answer involves, with equal necessity, the judgment that conduct should aim to conserve and increase life. But Optimism and Pessimism not only thus determine, each in its own way, the final purpose of conduct; they also contain implicitly the principle for the evaluation of life. The grounds on which the optimist justifies his assertion that life is desirable must contain the elements of value or worth in life. Similarly, the reasons upon which the pessimist bases his condemnation of life must exhibit in a negative way, by their very absence, the same or other elements of value. And in case all the reasons, both for the justification and for the condemnation of life, can be shown to be reducible to a common denominator, we should then have a term in which life may be ultimately evaluated.

Such a procedure assumes the significance and legitimacy of an inquiry concerning the worth of life itself. And perhaps the pertinency of this inquiry will not be generally doubted. But one ethical writer, Professor S. Alexander, has boldly challenged the question. He says: "If you can show me where living competes with non-living, and on which side the question is decided, I will allow that life itself can be tried by the standard of use or value. Till you do so I can attach no meaning to the question. The question to which I can attach a meaning is the question, What form of life has use or worth?" Mr. Alexander's position, it is clear, rests upon an assumed